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Abstract
This thesis studies the inability of search models to match both observed labor market flows and
the empirical wage distribution. I show that a known feature of the labor market, that unemployment
hurts workers’ wages, has an important effect on workers’ search behavior, and explains why we
observe that similar workers are paid different wages.
The first chapter reviews the relevant literature. I begin by describing the findings in Hornstein,
Krusell and Violante (2011) that baseline search models struggle to generate significant wage disper-
sion, the so-called frictional wage dispersion puzzle. Further, search models face a trade-off between
matching the cross-sectional wage distribution and matching the cyclical volatility of unemployment
and vacancies. The chapter reviews the unemployment volatility puzzle and explains this trade-off.
Given that the thesis introduces the loss of human capital during unemployment, the chapter ends
with a review of the related empirical literature.
Chapter 2 studies wage dispersion among identical workers in a random matching search model
in which workers lose human capital during unemployment. Wage dispersion increases, as workers
accept lower wages to avoid long unemployment spells. I show that the model is an important
improvement over baseline search models. The model with unemployment history explains between
a third and half of the observed residual wage dispersion.
In Chapter 3 I add on-the-job search to the model with unemployment history. Workers accept
lower wages because they keep the option of searching for better paying jobs. Wage dispersion
increases significantly. The model accounts for all of the residual wage dispersion. The model also
generates substantial wage dispersion even for high values of non-market time. The chapter thus
addresses the trade-off between explaining frictional wage dispersion and the cyclical behavior of
unemployment.
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Chapter 1
The Frictional Wage Dispersion
Puzzle and the Effects of
Unemployment on Wages: A
Review
Empirical evidence suggests that similar workers are paid different wages. The
labor literature has studied in detail how worker characteristics, such as education
or tenure, affect wages. However, worker characteristics can only explain a fraction
of the observed wage dispersion in the data. In a typical Mincerian wage regression
with as many controls as possible the residual still displays a large amount of
dispersion. Workers that are observationally similar are paid different wages.
Search models of the labor market can explain why similar workers are paid
different wages. The intuition is the following. Firms and workers enter the labor
market randomly, because job positions are available when firms have an unfilled
position, and workers apply to vacant positions when they search for jobs. Know-
ing that job offers are only available with a given frequency, workers accept a job
offer if the associated wage is above their reservation value —if the wage is high
enough. When the wage is above the reservation value they are better off taking
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the job than remaining unemployed and continuing with their search. This accep-
tance rule by workers generates wage dispersion, even among identical workers.1
However, recent work by Andreas Hornstein, Per Krusell and Giovanni L. Violante
(2011) shows that baseline search models fail to generate significant wage disper-
sion. These findings represent a great challenge to the search literature, so this
chapter begins by reviewing the frictional wage dispersion puzzle in search mod-
els. This puzzle is related to the inability of baseline search models to account for
cyclical fluctuations in unemployment and vacancies, what is known in the litera-
ture as the Shimer critique. I review this critique and show why there is a trade-off
between addressing it and addressing the frictional wage dispersion puzzle. Given
that this thesis studies what happens to wage dispersion among identical workers
when they lose some human capital during unemployment, the chapter ends with
a review of the empirical literature on the effects of job displacement on workers
earnings.
1.1 Frictional Wage Dispersion in Search Models
In search models workers look for jobs and firms for job applicants. Knowing
that job positions are only available with a given frequency, workers’ best strategy
is to set a reservation wage and accept a job offer when the wage is above this
reservation value. This search strategy explains why two identical workers may be
paid different wages. Wages may be different because some workers were luckier
in their job search.
To understand the frictional wage dispersion puzzle consider first how workers
decide when to accept a job offer in baseline search models. When considering a
wage offer, unemployed workers compare the value of accepting the job to the value
of staying in unemployment —their outside option. First, the value of accepting
the job depends on the wage offered and how long the match is expected to last.
As for the value of unemployment, if workers remain unemployed they receive
1The literature uses the term frictional wage dispersion to describe wage dispersion among
identical workers arising from search frictions. See for example Dale T. Mortensen (2005). To
avoid repetition I use wage dispersion to refer to wage dispersion among ex-ante identical workers.
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unemployment benefits and can continue looking for other jobs. How much this
search option is worth depends on how easy it is to find jobs and what is the
expected gain from accepting a job, as given by the wage distribution. Therefore,
unemployment benefits, the wage distribution and labor market flows —the job
finding and separation rates— are important for workers’ choice of reservation
wage.
Because the reservation wage determines how quickly workers find jobs, labor
market transitions are the result of workers’ choice. Therefore, wage dispersion
and labor market flows are closely related in the search framework. However,
Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2011) find that baseline search models are unable
to reconcile the empirical wage distribution with the observed labor market flows.
Intuitively, the expected gain from looking for jobs is higher if wages are more
disperse. If one takes the empirical wage distribution as given, in the baseline
search model workers wait too long to leave unemployment compared to empirical
unemployment durations. Alternatively, unemployment durations can only be as
low as in the data if the wage distribution is very compressed. In this case the
expected gain from an additional search is very low, so workers accept jobs quickly.
This is the frictional wage dispersion puzzle. The empirical values for labor market
flows imply that search models struggle to generate significant wage dispersion.
Next I review more formally how the frictional dispersion puzzle arises in search
models, as found in Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2011).
1.1.1 The Mm ratio in baseline search models
To measure wage dispersion Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2011) use the ratio
between the mean observed wage and the minimum wage, the so-called mean-min
or Mm ratio. This measure has many advantages. In most search models one can
derive an expression for the Mm ratio that depends only on a few parameters, for
which reliable estimates exist. Most importantly, the Mm ratio is independent
of the distribution from which workers draw offers. Because in later chapters I
extent the random matching model of Christopher A. Pissarides (1985), I show
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how to derive the Mm ratio in this model. However, the Mm ratio is exactly the
same for a large class of search models.
In Pissarides (1985) workers look for jobs and firms look for applicants. Once
a worker and a firm meet, the match has a specific productivity p. The match-
specific productivity is drawn from a known distribution F (p). Workers receive
job offers at rate f , and firms receive applicants at rate q, which are endogenous
and given by a matching function. Once employed they stay on the job until
separation occurs, which happens at the exogenous rate s. During unemployment
workers receive benefits b.2 Because of free entry in vacancies, firms post vacancies
until the value of the vacancy is zero. The surplus from the match is split between
the firm and the worker according to Nash Bargaining, with workers receiving a
share β of the surplus. This sharing rule gives a perfect mapping between match
productivities and wages w = w(p). In this framework, workers’ optimal decision
consists of setting a reservation productivity p∗, and accept a job if the match-
specific productivity is above p∗.
The Mm ratio is given by Mm = w¯/w∗, where w¯ = E(w|p > p∗) is the average
observed wage, and w∗ the minimum observed wage. The mathematical appendix
at the end of this chapter derives the following expression relating w¯ and w∗
w∗ = b+
f ∗
r + s
(w¯ − w∗). (1.1)
where r is the interest rate. I use f ∗ = f(1 − F (p∗)) to denote the job finding
rate, as only matches above p∗ are formed. Assume that b = ρw¯, where ρ is the
replacement rate. From the above equation one can derive the following expression
for the Mm ratio
Mm =
1 + f
∗
r+s
ρ+ f
∗
r+s
. (1.2)
As the expression (1.2) shows, the biggest advantage of using the Mm ratio to
2One can also interpret b as the value of non-market time, which may also include the value
of leisure.
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measure wage dispersion is that its expression is independent of any assumption
about the distribution of matches F (p), for which there is very little knowledge.
While F (p) is implicit in the equation through f ∗, this is simply the job finding
rate, which is observed empirically and can thus be treated as a parameter. This
is one of the great contributions of Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2011).
TheMm ratio is uniquely determined by the set of parameters r, f ∗, s and ρ. In
particular, (1.2) shows that increasing the dispersion of F (p) does not necessarily
deliver higher wage dispersion. Wage dispersion is eventually constrained by labor
market flows f ∗ and s, which reflect workers’ optimal search behavior. The effects
of f ∗, s and ρ on the Mm ratio are intuitive. With a higher job finding rate f ∗
workers find jobs more easily, so their option of searching gains value. Workers
become pickier and raise their reservation wage. Because now they reject some
of the worse matches and only accept the better ones, wage dispersion decreases.
The separation rate s has the opposite effect. When s is high workers lose their
jobs more quickly, so having a job has a lower value. Workers become less picky,
they lower their reservation wage, which increases wage dispersion. Finally, if ρ
is higher, the outside option of workers increases, they become pickier and raise
their reservation wage, thus lowering wage dispersion.3
While expression (1.2) corresponds to the Pissarides random matching model,
Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2011) show that the Mm ratio has the exact same
value for a large class of search models. As the authors state, all models that satisfy
the following properties have the same Mm ratio: “1) perfect correlation between
between job values and initial wages 2) risk neutrality 3) random search 4) no on-
the-job search”. The intuition is that the mechanism behind the offer distribution
F (.) from which workers sample offers is irrelevant. All that matters is workers’
choice of reservation value, which determines the mass of jobs accepted 1−F ∗ and
eventually translates into the job finding rate f(1 − F ∗). Included in this class
are the other baseline search models in John J McCall (1970), Robert Jr. Lucas
and Edward C. Prescott (1974); search models with vintage of capital such as in
3Section 1.2 discusses the role of ρ in more detail.
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Philippe Aghion and Peter Howitt (1994), Dale T. Mortensen and Christopher A.
Pissarides (1998) or Andreas Hornstein, Per Krusell and Giovanni L. Violante
(2007b); and search models with efficiency wages.
1.1.2 Quantifying the Mm ratio
Expression (1.2) gives the Mm ratio in baseline search models as a function of
r, f ∗, s and ρ. Calibrating these parameters to the US economy provides the
amount of wage dispersion consistent with data. The interest rate r is chosen
to be consistent with an annual value of 5%, which gives a monthly value of
r = 0.0041. Robert Shimer (2007) provides the values for the finding rate and
the job separation rate, which are the reference in the literature.4 For the period
1994:Q1-2007:Q1, the job finding rate is f ∗ = 0.43, and the job separation rate
s = 0.03.5 Finally, the replacement ratio ρ is assumed to be 40%, which is the
value used in Robert Shimer (2005). This value is based on average unemployment
insurance benefits. While the search literature sometimes uses higher values for
ρ, this would only decrease the Mm ratio and make the frictional wage dispersion
puzzle worse, so for now I use this lower value. I discuss the role of ρ and the
implications of using higher values in more detail in section 1.2 and in the final
chapter.
With this calibration the Mm ratio is around 1.05 in baseline search models.
This implies that the average observed wage is 5% above the minimum observed
wage. However, the 50-10 percentile ratio of the residual in a Mincerian regressions
with as many controls as possible is between 1.7 and 1.9. Given that this is a
reasonable empirical counterpart to the theoretical Mm ratio, the large difference
between the two values —1.05 vs 1.7 to 1.9— formally illustrates the frictional
wage dispersion puzzle. Search models simply cannot generate significant wage
dispersion.
4The advantage with Robert Shimer (2007) estimates is that they use information on whether
workers found and lost jobs between two employment status observations, something that is
missing in previous studies.
5Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2011) choose this time period because it also provides
estimates of job-to-job transitions, which are required later when studying on-the-job search.
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This inability to generate significant wage dispersion is not due to the use of
US data. A European calibration delivers a very similar Mm ratio, even without
changing the replacement ratio to reflect the larger unemployment benefits in
Europe. Further, including three employment states —employed, unemployed
and inactive— delivers almost the same Mm ratio.
1.1.3 Extensions of baseline search models
In baseline search models workers’ labor market outcomes are different because
some workers are luckier in their search than others. However, many known fea-
tures of the labor market are still missing. Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2011)
evaluate wage dispersion when the baseline search model is extended to include
some of them. I review their findings in this section. Table 1.1 summarizes the
Mm ratios and their calibrated values.
Endogenous search costs. If staying in unemployment is more costly, work-
ers are willing to leave unemployment more quickly. They reduce their reservation
wage, and as a result wage dispersion increases. Introducing search costs is one
way of inducing this. With search costs the Mm ratio is given by
Mm =
1 + f
∗
r+s
1
1+σ
ρ+ f
∗
r+s
1
1+σ
, (1.3)
where 1/σ is the elasticity of marginal return to search with respect to search
effort. Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2011) use the findings in Bent Jesper
Christensen, Rasmus Lentz, Dale T. Mortensen, George R. Neumann and Axel
Werwatz (2005) that σ ' 1, which gives an Mm ratio of 1.088.
Compensating differentials. Jobs have many attributes besides the wage
they pay. When considering a job, workers take into account the wage, but also
other aspects of the job such as location, benefits, etc. If these wage attributes
are negatively correlated with the wage, the model reconciles the observed unem-
ployment durations and wage dispersion better. In such scenario workers accept
lower wages because they carry positive attributes that compensate for the low
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pay. This leads to higher wage dispersion compared to baseline models. Unfortu-
nately, this is not empirically valid. Empirical studies find that the correlation is
small and usually positive.
Stochastic wages. In baseline search models the quality of the match, or its
productivity, remains constant until the job is destroyed. If instead the produc-
tivity of the job changes, workers accept lower paying jobs because wages are not
low forever. Assume now that at rate λ the productivity of the job changes, which
is captured as a draw from the original distribution of wages F (.). If the new pro-
ductivity level is below the reservation value, the match is destroyed. Therefore,
separations are now endogenous, and happen at rate s∗ = λF (w∗). The expression
for the Mm ratio is given by
Mm =
1 + f
∗−λ+s∗
r+λ
ρ+ f
∗−λ+s∗
r+λ
. (1.4)
However, given that wages are extremely persistent, empirically λ is close to zero.
The implied Mm ratio is almost the same as in the baseline model. The dif-
ference between this model and that of Dale T. Mortensen and Christopher A.
Pissarides (1994) is that job productivity begins with maximum productivity in
the Mortensen-Pissarides model. With this assumption wage dispersion is lower
than in (1.4).
Risk aversion. In the baseline search model workers are risk-neutral. How-
ever, given that unemployment is associated with lower consumption, risk-averse
workers want to leave unemployment more quickly than risk-neutral workers. The
reservation wage is lower with risk-aversion and wage dispersion increases. The
extreme case with no storage technology —i.e. no savings— gives the highest Mm
ratio. If u(c) is the utility of consumption and worker’s consumption is c = b if
unemployed, and c = w if employed, the Mm ratio is given by
Mm =
(
f∗
r+s
(1 + 1
2
(θ − 1)θcv2) + ρ1−θ
1 + f
∗
r+s
) 1
θ−1
, (1.5)
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where θ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and cv is the coefficient of
variation of the wage distribution. With θ = 2 and cv = 0.3 the Mm ratio is 1.2.
However, if workers can save or borrow the Mm ratio would be lower, as they
can self-insure, thus bringing the economy closer to risk-neutrality. Per Krusell,
Toshihiko Mukoyama and Aysegul Sahin (2010) show that in a Pissarides model
with uninsurable risk —i.e. with savings but borrowing only during employment—
the Mm ratio is very small, similar to the one in baseline search models.
Directed search. Espen R. Moen (1997) first introduced directed search.
Firms post wages, and workers can choose where to direct their search. Because
firms that post higher wages attract more applicants, workers face a trade-off
between higher wages and shorter unemployment spells. If they direct their search
to better paying jobs they can earn higher wages, but the queue is longer, so they
have to wait longer before getting an offer. If fi is the arrival rate of offers if the
worker applies to firm i, and f¯ that of firms paying the average wage, the Mm
ratio is given by the following
Mm =
1 + (1 + fmin
r+s
) f¯
fmin−f¯
ρ+ (1 + fmin
r+s
) f¯
fmin−f¯
≤ 1 +
f¯
r+s
ρ+ f¯
r+s
. (1.6)
Based on evidence by R Wolthoff (2012), f¯ is almost the same than the average job
finding rate. Therefore, the upper bound of the Mm ratio in the above expression
is almost the same as the Mm ratio for the baseline model.
On-the-job search. On-the-job search is one of the most promising avenues
to generate significant amounts of wage dispersion. In baseline search models
workers stay on the same job until separation occurs. If we allow workers to search
for jobs while being employed, unemployed workers become less picky and accept
lower wages because they keep the option of searching. Hornstein, Krusell and
Violante (2011) show that the Mm ratio in a generalized version of the on-the-job
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search model of Kenneth Burdett (1978) is given by
Mm ' 1 +
fu−fe
r+s+fe
ρ+ f
u−fe
r+s+fe
, (1.7)
where fu is the job finding rate for the unemployed, and f e is the arrival rate of
offers to employed workers. Using job-to-job transition rates gives a calibration
for f e, and implies an Mm ratio between 1.16 and 1.27. Chapter 3 discusses this
model in more detail.
Table 1.1: Mm ratio in search models
Model Mm ratio Value Description/Comments
Baseline
1+ f
∗
r+s
ρ+ f
∗
r+s
1.05
Endogenous
search costs
1+ f
∗
r+s
1
1+σ
ρ+ f
∗
r+s
1
1+σ
1.09
1/σ elasticity of marginal return to
search w.r.t search effort
Stochastic
wages
1+ f
∗−λ+s∗
r+λ
ρ+ f
∗−λ+s∗
r+λ
1.05
λ arrival rate of productivity shocks,
s∗ endogenous job separation
Risk aversion
(
f∗
r+s
(1+ 1
2
(θ−1)θcv2)+ρ1−θ
1+ f
∗
r+s
)
1
θ−1 1.2
θ CRRA, cv wage distribution’s co-
efficient of variation. Problem: No
savings; when add savings Mm same
as in baseline
Directed search
1+(1+
fmin
r+s
) f¯
fmin−f¯
ρ+(1+
fmin
r+s
) f¯
fmin−f¯
≤ 1+
f¯
r+s
ρ+ f¯
r+s
≤ 1.05 fi arrival rate of offers from firm i, f¯
from firms paying the average wage
On-the-job
search
≈ 1+
fu−fe
r+s+fe
ρ+ f
u−fe
r+s+fe
[1.16; 1.27]
fu job finding rate, fe arrival rate
of offers on-the-job
Endogenous
search costs and
on-the-job
[
1+
fu−fw∗
r+s
1
1+γ
ρ+
fu−fw∗
r+s
1
1+γ
,
1+
fu−fw∗
r+s+fw
∗ 11+γ
ρ+
fu−fw∗
r+s+fw
∗ 11+γ
] [1.22; 1.90]
Problem: Counterfactual result, im-
plies < 0 value of non-market time
net of search costs
Notes.- f∗ and s are the job finding and separation rates; r the interest rate; ρ the replacement rate, b/w¯. See
text for details of the calibrations.
Two models that embed on-the-job search generate substantial wage disper-
sion, although their assumptions are somewhat controversial.
In the Christensen et al. (2005) model of endogenous search effort workers can
search on-the-job. During unemployment they choose the arrival rate of job offers
at a cost. Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2011) find bounds for the Mm ratio
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in this model, which are given by
1 + fu−fw∗
r+s
1
1+γ
ρ+ fu−fw∗
r+s
1
1+γ
≤Mm ≤
1 + fu−fw∗
r+s+fw∗
1
1+γ
ρ+ fu−fw∗
r+s+fw∗
1
1+γ
. (1.8)
As in the case of endogenous search efforts, γ is the inverse of the elasticity of
marginal return to search with respect to search effort. Using Danish data, Chris-
tensen et al. (2005) estimate γ to be around 1. Parameters fu and fw∗ refer to
the job finding rate of the unemployed and of workers who earn the reservation
wage. Michael Rosholm and Michael Svarer (2004) find that the ratio between
these two finding rates is around 64% for Danish data. Left with no other choice
but to assume the same ratio for US data, Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2011)
calibrate fw∗ to be 0.27. This calibration implies that the Mm ratio is between
1.22 and 1.90. However, this model has controversial results. While it can po-
tentially generate substantial wage dispersion, the bounds of the Mm ratio imply
that non-market time net of search costs is between zero and a large negative
number.6
A number of papers introduce sequential auctions between employers in a
model of on-the-job search. These include Fabien Postel-Vinay and Jean-Marc
Robin (2002a), Fabien Postel-Vinay and JeanMarc Robin (2002b) Matthew S.
Dey and Christopher J. Flinn (2005) and Pierre Cahuc, Fabien Postel-Vinay and
Jean-Marc Robin (2006). When an employed worker receives an offer from an out-
side employer, the current employer can make a counteroffer to keep the worker,
and so both firms enter in an auction. Wage dispersion is larger in this setting
because wages grow even if workers stay on the same job. In its most extreme case,
which delivers the largest wage dispersion, workers extract a share β of the surplus
when they start at a job, and get the marginal product p from their employer once
they are contacted by an outside firm. If β is low enough, the Mm ratio is larger
than 1/ρ.7 However, these models are controversial. True, these type of auctions
6The baseline search model also generates substantial wage dispersion if the value of non-
market time is negative and large enough.
7Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2011) show that models with tenure contracts, such as
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may be common in the academic labor market. But as both Dale T. Mortensen
(2005) and Robert E. Hall and Paul R. Milgrom (2008) point out, these auctions
are absent in almost all occupations in the labor market, probably because of
asymmetric information problems. Once the worker holds an outside offer, it is
difficult to credibly communicate its terms to her employer, for the outside firm
has little incentive to corroborate the existence and the terms of the offer. And
if firms were to communicate, nothing would stop them from colluding. Further,
because reacting to outside offers may create incentives for workers to look for
jobs, firms’ optimal strategy may be to commit to no counter-offers in response to
this moral hazard problem.8
While these explanations may be appealing and interesting, lack of data and
some controversial assumptions and results make them insufficient, suggesting
more work needs to be done.
1.2 Trade-off with Cyclical Unemployment Fluc-
tuations
The frictional wage dispersion puzzle has further implications for search models’
ability to account for empirical observations. Looking at the intuition behind the
puzzle —that given the empirical wage distribution, workers in baseline search
models wait too long before accepting an offer— shows that making unemployment
less attractive helps to solve this problem. The value of non-market time, as
captured by the replacement ratio ρ, is one of the determinants of the value of
unemployment. So when the value of non-market time is low, unemployment is
less attractive and workers accept worse offers. In other words, a lower value
of non-market time reduces workers’ reservation wage. Therefore, search models
require low values of non-market time to account for wage dispersion.
However, Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2011) observe that this relationship
Stevens (2004) and Burdett and Coles (2003) are equivalent to this model with a β equal to 0.
The problem is that if β is 0, the reservation wage is negative.
8Competition between job applicants would also slow down wage growth.
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between non-market time and wage dispersion leads to a trade-off between solv-
ing the frictional wage dispersion puzzle and accounting for cyclical fluctuations
in unemployment and vacancies. Shimer (2005) finds that search and matching
models are unable to generate enough volatility in unemployment and vacancies
compared to the data, a problem often referred to as the Shimer critique. The
trade-off arises because low values of non-market time increase wage dispersion but
reduce unemployment volatility during the cycle. And vice-versa, with high values
of non-market time baseline search models can account for the cyclical volatility
of unemployment and vacancies, but then they struggle even more to generate
significant wage dispersion.
Next, I briefly review the literature on the Shimer critique and formally show
the trade-off with the frictional wage dispersion problem.
1.2.1 Labor market fluctuations: The Shimer critique
The intuition for why search models are unable to account for the cyclical fluc-
tuations in unemployment and vacancies is the following. When labor produc-
tivity increases relative to vacancy costs and the value of non-market time, firms
respond by posting more vacancies, which drives the vacancy rate up. At the
same time, as firms post more vacancies workers find jobs more quickly, which re-
duces unemployment. Overall, labor market tightness —the ratio of the vacancy
and unemployment rates— increases with productivity. This is the prediction of
the canonical search model, as in Pissarides (1985) or Christopher A. Pissarides
(2000). Labor market tightness is procyclical, and unemployment and vacancies
are negatively correlated —this negative correlation is known as the Beveridge
Curve.
However, Shimer (2005) finds that fluctuations in labor market tightness are
much larger in the data than what the model predicts. At the source of the
problem lies the fact that the job finding rate increases with labor productivity.
When productivity increases, this relationship between the job finding rate and
labor productivity raises the value of unemployment. Because wage payments have
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to cover workers’ outside option, the increase in productivity pushes wages up. The
increase in wages shrinks profits, which reduces the incentive to post vacancies.
Overall, the value of unemployment plays such a strong role in the determination
of wages that workers keep most of the gain from the rise in productivity, leaving
profits almost unaffected. As vacancies barely move, labor market tightness is only
mildly procyclical, and the economy experiences only a small movement along the
Beveridge Curve.
Using data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), Shimer (2005) reports
that the standard deviation of market tightness and labor productivity —around
their trend— is 0.38 and 0.02, so labor productivity is 20 times more volatile
than productivity. By contrast, using estimates on job finding and separation
rates for the US economy the elasticity of labor market tightness with respect to
productivity is close to one.9 This value implies that the empirical fluctuations
and the model’s prediction can only be reconciled if the value of non-market time
is close to labor productivity. In the model the standard deviation of labor market
tightness around its trend is 0.037, only 10% of its empirical counterpart.10
Shimer (2005) and some of the papers that followed argued that the inability
to account for these cyclical fluctuations is not really a failure of the search model,
but rather the result of assuming that wages are determined by Nash Bargaining.
A productive match between the firm and the worker creates a surplus. To close
the model, one needs to make an assumption as to how these rents are shared
between both parties. With Nash Bargaining wages respond almost one to one to
productivity, thus unfolding the mechanism described earlier of small profits and
little incentives to post vacancies.
I follow Dale T. Mortensen and Eva Nagypal (2007) and Christopher A. Pis-
9This is another of the great contributions of the work in Shimer (2005). Estimates of the job
finding and separation rates based only on employment status fail to account for the fact that
workers may find and lose jobs between employment status observations. By using information
on short term unemployment, Shimer (2005) is able to account for this. The estimates have
become the standard in the literature.
10Shimer (2005) also finds that in the model shocks to the separation rate lead to a counter-
factual upward sloping Beveridge Curve.
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sarides (2009) and formally describe the Shimer critique using a continuous time
version of the Pissarides (2000) model because it provides a more intuitive ex-
position. Shimer (2005) solves its stochastic version. In his model one equation
determines labor market tightness for each state of the economy, which can be
easily solved numerically. Once labor market tightness is known, the rest of the
variables are determined as in the Pissarides model. As labor productivity is very
persistent and labor market flows are large, unemployment and vacancies adjust
very quickly compared to productivity. Labor market tightness is the key driver
in the model, so comparing steady states at different levels of productivity, as
Mortensen and Nagypal (2007) and Pissarides (2009) do, is an accurate descrip-
tion of cyclical fluctuations.11
The model is the same as the one in section 1.1.1, only that labor productivity
p is no longer drawn from a distribution F (p). Instead all matches have the same
productivity, but p changes with the cycle. As before, the job finding rate f is a
function of labor market tightness θ, and satisfies f(θ) = θq(θ).12 Separations are
exogenous.13 As before, unemployed workers receive b, and firms post vacancies
at a cost k. Wages are determined by Nash Bargaining, with workers receiving a
share β of the surplus.
Let U and W be the value of being unemployed and employed, and V and J
of a vacancy and a filled position. I show here the equations and results that are
relevant for the exposition, but the derivations are included in the mathematical
appendix at the end of the chapter. The model gives the following expression for
11Shimer (2005) made the same point. He shows that the steady state version of the model is
an accurate description of the stochastic model.
12I can drop θ from the notation when I studied frictional wage dispersion because it focuses
on the steady state.
13Pissarides (2009) discusses in detail why endogenous separations barely affect job creation
and shows that the results are the same if separations are exogenous. Intuitively, jobs at the
reservation productivity yield zero profits. Therefore, changes in the reservation productivity
leaves the expected profits from an average job almost unchanged, which is what drives job
creation.
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wages
w = rU + β(p− rU − (r + s)V ). (1.9)
Expression (1.9) illustrates more formally the point made by Shimer. The value of
unemployment U enters the wage expression because it is workers’ outside option,
and thus their threat point in the bargaining process. However, U responds to
current labor conditions. When productivity increases, firms post more vacancies
and drive the job finding rate up. This increases U and thus wages. Solving
further gives the following expression for wages
w = (1− β)b+ β(p+ θk), (1.10)
which is the same as equation (7) in Shimer (2005) and (10) in Pissarides (2009).
I use the notation εθ and εw for the elasticities of θ and w with respect to p,
and η for the elasticity of q(θ) with respect to θ.14 Using the free entry condition
for vacancies and the asset equations, in the appendix I find εθ as a function of εw
εθ =
1
η
p− εww
p− w . (1.11)
What is the target for the elasticity εθ? As mentioned earlier, Shimer (2005)
finds that the standard deviation of labor market tightness θ is around 19.1 times
that of labor productivity p. However, as work by Mortensen and Nagypal (2007)
points out, empirically labor productivity is not the only variable affecting labor
market tightness. So the model should only try to explain the volatility of labor
market tightness that is correlated with productivity. In other words, the residual
in a regression of labor market tightness on labor productivity is very large. As
this residual captures fluctuations in labor market tightness that are generated by
movements in other variables, we should not expect the model to account for it.
Instead, the coefficient in a regression of θ on p should be the target. It is obtained
14i.e. η = −q′(θ)θ/q(θ), with a minus sign because q′(θ) < 0.
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by multiplying the ratio of standard deviations with value 19.1 by the correlation
coefficient between θ and p, which gives a target of 7.56.
When the canonical search model is calibrated to the US economy, wages are
almost as cyclical as productivity. To illustrate Shimer’s point, if εw is close
to 1, equation (1.11) shows that εθ = 1/η, which is around 2 using a standard
calibration for η of 0.5. As the target for this elasticity is 7.56, the canonical
model is unable to generate the observed cyclical volatility. This is in a nutshell
the Shimer critique. More formally, the elasticity εθ is given by
εθ =
r + s+ βf(θ)
η(r + s) + βf(θ)
.
p
p− b. (1.12)
Pissarides (2009) and Mortensen and Nagypal (2007) calibrate this model, and find
that εθ is 1.71 when Shimer’s value of the replacement ratio is used. Although
with the new target of 7.56 the canonical model’s performance is not as terrible,
the generated fluctuations still fall short. It generates only around a fourth of the
empirical value.15
What drives the model’s inability to generate enough fluctuations in its key
variable θ is the following. Because the wage closely follows productivity, most
of the productivity shock translates into wages. This leaves firms’ profits unaf-
fected, so firms have no incentives to post more or less vacancies. More formally,
equilibrium θ is the solution to
(1− β)(p− b)
k
=
r + s
q(θ)
+ βθ. (1.13)
This gives the following elasticity ε˜θ of market tightness θ with respect to net
productivity p− b
ε˜θ =
r + s+ βf(θ)
η(r + s) + βf(θ)
. (1.14)
15Hall and Milgrom (2008) also run regressions on lagged productivity and find similar re-
sults. The canonical model with Shimer’s calibration explains around one fourth of the observed
volatility.
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With Shimer’s calibration, (1.14) implies that ε˜θ is around 1.03.
16 Using this
value and wage equation (1.10) shows that a one percent increase in net labor
productivity p − b leads to a one percent increase in θ, thus increasing w − b
by one percent. Profits are unaffected, so firms do not post more vacancies in
response to this one percent rise in productivity.
Finally, to provide an indication of what changes in a stochastic setting, Shimer
(2005) solves a stochastic version of this model in which productivity p and the
separation rate s change with a frequency λ. Labor market tightness is a function
of the state (p, s). All equations are similar, only that labor market tightness θp,s
is found by solving numerically the following equation, which is equation (6) in
his paper
r + s+ λ
q(θp,s)
+ βθp,s = (1− β)p− b
k
+ λEp,s(
1
θp′,s′
), (1.15)
where Ep,s(.) is the expectation over p and s. His simulations confirm that the
predictions of this model are a good approximation of the earlier static model —
which corresponds to λ = 0. This comes from the high persistence of productivity
compared to labor market flows.
1.2.2 Attempts to reconcile model and data
The response that followed Shimer’s critique initially focused on blaming the Nash
bargaining process. With this wage rule, wages respond just too much to labor
productivity shocks. If wages are instead rigid, the argument goes, wages respond
less to productivity shocks and firms’ profits fluctuate more over the cycle. This
generates more fluctuations in vacancies.
However, as Mortensen and Nagypal (2007) point out, unless an unrealistic
wage rigidity is assumed, wage rigidity is not enough.17 As they argue, the low
16Note that ε˜θ in Shimer (2005) has 1 − η instead of η. But this is because η here is the
elasticity of q(.), not of f(.). The result is thus the same.
17For example, the wage as a social norm in Hall (2005) can only exist if the only source of
fluctuations are very small aggregate shocks, which is inconsistent with the large flows in the
labor market. Otherwise it violates rationality.
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fluctuations found in Shimer (2005) come from three sources. First, a low value
of the elasticity of the job finding rate, 1− η in the model of the previous section.
Second, a low value of non-market time. Finally, too much feedback from the job
finding rate f(θ) to wages, which is exactly what happens if wages are determined
by Nash bargaining.
I discuss in what follows how addressing the three sources of low fluctuations
improves the performance of the canonical model. Two results become clear.
First, one cannot generate significant fluctuations by addressing only one of these
sources. Second, in all cases higher values of non-market time are needed. This
is crucial for frictional wage dispersion, as with these higher values search models
can barely generate any wage dispersion.
Early successful attempts
Shimer (2005) already discusses the role of the elasticity of the job finding rate
1−η. He uses a value of 0.28, which delivers an elasticity of labor market tightness
with respect to net labor productivity ε˜θ of 1.03. However, when the value is close
to zero, ε˜θ is still only 1.39, and 1.15 when the value is 0.1. Mortensen and
Nagypal (2007) find a similar result. The elasticity εθ, this time with respect
to labor productivity, goes from 1.71 to only 1.82 when one uses the alternative
calibration 1− η = 0.544. So the elasticity 1− η, by itself, is not the reason why
the elasticities εθ or ε˜θ are so low in the model.
Turning to the value of non-market time, Hall and Milgrom (2008) use evi-
dence from consumption and hours data, and calibrate the value of non-market
time b to match the Frisch elasticities of consumption demand and labor supply.
This procedure gives them a value of 0.71 for non-market time. With this value
the elasticity εθ is 3.67, around half the target, which is quite an improvement.
To further amplify fluctuations and match the empirical values, Hall and Milgrom
(2008) drop the Nash Bargaining assumption. Instead, they introduce the sequen-
tial bargaining in Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986). Workers and firms
make alternating offers and incur some delay costs during bargaining. There is
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now a difference between the outside option and the disagreement payoffs. This
is the sequential bargaining’s key innovation. With Nash Bargaining, if workers
get a poor offer they break negotiations and get the outside option. However, the
outside option is not a credible threat unless its value is very high. In sequential
bargaining, when an offer is low workers reject the offer but continue to bargain by
making a counteroffer.18 The resulting wage responds less to current labor market
conditions, as it breaks the link between wages and the value of unemployment U .
Thus firms’ hiring fluctuates more. With both these alternative assumptions, Hall
and Milgrom (2008) match the volatility in unemployment and vacancies without
unrealistic wage stickiness.19
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) argue differently. The problem is not the wage
rule, but the calibration used. They propose a new calibration for the value of
non-market time b and for the bargaining power β. The values b and β are chosen
to match the elasticities of labor market tightness and wages εθ and εw.
20 This
calibration strategy gives them a very high value for non-market time of 0.955,
and a very low value for β of 0.052. Intuitively, the extreme values for b and
β imply very small firm profits.21 Because of this small size, small changes in
profits drive big relative changes. This generates large fluctuations in vacancies.
Mechanically, such a high b implies a large value for p/(p− b) in (1.12), and thus
in εθ. However, their target is to generate the large fluctuations in the elasticity
of labor market tightness εθ as found in Shimer (2005). The elasticity εθ is 26.83,
which as Mortensen and Nagypal (2007) mentions, is too high of a target.
These findings show that generating significant labor market fluctuations re-
quires high values of non-market time. With such values, search models struggle
18Similarly when the firm receives an offer.
19In this literature wage rigidity or stickiness refers loosely to how much wages respond to
productivity.
20As in Hall and Milgrom (2008), they need a value for the cost of vacancies. They calibrate
the capital and labor costs of vacancies, which provides them with the total cost of vacancies.
In their calibration capital costs are 47% of labor productivity, and labor costs 11%.
21The high vacancy costs also imply lower profits. β has a very small impact on fluctuations
in θ, but allows the wage rule to match an empirical wage rigidity of 0.449. Otherwise, with a
standard β the wage elasticity is 0.964, exactly Shimer’s point.
30
even more to account for frictional wage dispersion.
Criticisms
Despite the success of Hall and Milgrom (2008) and Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2008), there has been some criticism of their findings, especially of the work of
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008).
I begin with Hall and Milgrom (2008). First, the authors close their model
by calibrating two key parameters in their model —the cost of delay in negoti-
ations γ and the probability that negotiations break δ— to match the average
unemployment and the elasticity εθ. Although their calibrated values are rea-
sonable, there is little information about their empirical value.22 In particular, if
delay costs depend on wages or productivity the mechanism would generate less
fluctuations. Further, Pissarides (2009) argues that wage rigidity can not be the
answer to Shimer’s critique. He proves that if new matches are determined by
Nash Bargaining, then the job creation condition is the same no matter how the
continuation wages are determined.23 Since he argues that empirically wages in
new matches follow productivity very closely, rigidity cannot be the answer. How-
ever, as Hall and Milgrom (2008) argue, the standard errors in the estimate for
new matches includes their value of wage rigidity, so this seems less controversial.
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) has received more criticism. First, with such
a high value of non-market time the response of unemployment to unemployment
insurance is too high, as research by Costain and Reiter (2008) shows. Hall and
Milgrom (2008) find a similar result. The value of non-market time in Hagedorn
and Manovskii (2008) implies that the Frisch labor supply elasticity is too high,
around 2.6. The second source of criticism argues that with the low value for
the share of surplus β, workers only receive 2.3% of the surplus. While including
taxes lowers the value of non-market time to around 0.67, it still implies the same
low share of surplus. Finally, a milder source of criticism takes issue with their
22If we consider delay costs to include the costs of idle capital, their value for γ of 0.23 is
well below that found in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), which is 0.43. But, it is particularly
difficult to disentangle delay costs from vacancy costs.
23Intuitively, the timing of wages does not matter for job creation.
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calibration of the capital costs of a vacancy. It assumes that a vacancy is caused
by a short fall in employment and that the capital that was being used becomes
idle.
In their defense, Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) argue theirs is not the only
model with such shortcomings. Strong responses to policy are common in models
that increase the amplification of shocks —such as some of the extensions of the
RBC model. Further, they argue that responses to policy such as unemployment
insurance are hard to measure in data, and suffer from endogeneity problems.
Finally, their focus is not on the source of the shock, but rather the response of
the model’s key variables. If policy is instead the focus, one needs to specify the
source —whether it is technology, capital or employment—, as it has important
implications for the endogenous response of the model to the policy.
Further attempts
In his work, Shimer (2005) already suggests some of the modifications that could
address his critique. These have been developed in some of the papers that fol-
lowed.24
Pissarides (2009) shows that if there are some fixed costs involved in creating
a vacancy, the model generates more fluctuations because costs are less cyclical
—fixed costs act in a similar way as delay costs in Hall and Milgrom (2008).
However, as Mortensen and Nagypal (2007) note, we do not have enough evidence
on the nature of fixed costs. Do they depend on w or p? This is crucial for the
argument to work. In a recent paper, Silva and Toledo (2012) show that if fixed
costs can be partially passed on to new hired workers in the form of lower wages,
then amplification is reduced. They also find a similar Costain and Reiter (2008)
critique. The response to changes in unemployment benefits is too high if the fixed
costs are set to match the fluctuations in labor market tightness θ.
Some more refined extensions include Menzio (2005) and Kennan (2010) ,
24Among others he mentions fixed costs (he shows that when q(θ) = µ is constant, which is
equivalent to fixed costs, fluctuations can be very large), asymmetric information, on-the-job
search, wage rigidity or specific capital.
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which create some endogenous wage rigidity by adding some asymmetric informa-
tion about match’s productivity, and Eyigungor (2010), which combines specific
capital and embodied technology to generate the observed fluctuations.25
Finally, Mortensen and Nagypal (2007) shows that shocks to s amplify fluctua-
tions only if the feedback from f(θ) to the wage is weak. Otherwise the Beveridge
Curve could even slope upwards, as Shimer (2005) shows. When using Hall and
Milgrom’s calibration and their wage determination mechanism the ratio σθ/σp
is 12.56 with shocks to labor productivity and separations. This is around two
thirds of its empirical counterpart —here one needs to use as a target the empirical
σθ/σp, which is 19.1, because both s and p shocks are the source of fluctuations.
A more detailed exposition of these extensions of the search models is unnec-
essary for the study of frictional wage dispersion. What matters is that all these
attempts to generate reasonable fluctuations require at least the value of non-
market time in Hall and Milgrom (2008). And the implications for the frictional
wage dispersion puzzle are significant.
Search and matching in RBC models
Despite the failure of the search and matching framework to match the cyclical
fluctuations in unemployment and vacancies, it is worth noting that search and
matching frictions are important for business cycle fluctuations. Merz (1995),
Andolfatto (1996) and den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000) show that search
and matching frictions improve the performance of RBC models. Among other
successes, they show that with this extension RBC models accurately replicate
movements in employment and wage fluctuations —in particular output and hours
fluctuate more than wages—, predict that productivity leads hours and deliver a
Beveridge Curve. Therefore, RBC models with search and matching frictions
explain business cycle fluctuations better than the competitive market model.
However, the problem is that these extensions of the RBC model are still unable to
25Vintage capital clearly increases fluctuations in vacancies and unemployment, but has coun-
terfactual implications for job destruction —when a technology shock arrives firms have incen-
tives to sell the old capital to acquire the new vintage. By adding specific capital the model
corrects for this and matches well the behavior of unemployment and vacancies.
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match fluctuations in θ, as wages are still too flexible because of Nash Bargaining.
1.2.3 Taking Stock: Implications for the Frictional Wage
Dispersion Puzzle
In the above discussion of what drives cyclical fluctuations in unemployment and
vacancies, the one element that has implications for frictional wage dispersion is
the value of non-market time. Wage dispersion in search models depends on labor
market flows, the interest rate and the value of non-market time —as captured by
the replacement ratio. Except for the value of non-market time, the rest of the
determinants of wage dispersion remain the same in all the different modifications
of the baseline search model that account for cyclical fluctuations.
One conclusion is clear from the discussion of the Shimer critique. To account
for fluctuations in unemployment and vacancies one needs high values of non-
market time. No matter what the extension or modification of the baseline search
model is, it needs to assume at the very least the value in Hall and Milgrom (2008).
However, higher values of the non-market time deliver even lower amounts of wage
dispersion. Therefore, there is a trade-off between accounting for labor market
cyclical fluctuations and generating significant wage dispersion.
Table 1.2: Mm ratio with different replacement ratios
Source ρ Mm ratio
Shimer (2005) 0.40 1.046
Hall & Milgrom (2008) 0.71 1.022
Hagedorn & Manovskii (2008) 0.95 1.004
More formally, consider the expression for the Mm ratio in (1.2). Clearly, the
Mm ratio decreases with the replacement ratio ρ. Table 1.2 shows the value of the
Mm ratio with replacement ratio ρ as in Hall and Milgrom (2008) and Hagedorn
and Manovskii (2008). The Mm ratio is 1.05 with the original value for ρ of 0.4.
With ρ equal to 0.71 —the value in Hall and Milgrom (2008)— it goes down to
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1.02. Finally, the replacement ratio in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), which has
a value of 0.955, delivers an Mm ratio of only 1.004. This latter value means that
the average wage is only 0.4% above the minimum observed wage, an extremely
low value. Figure 1.1 shows the Mm ratio as a function of the replacement ratio
ρ. It illustrates one of Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2011) points. Unless the
value of non-market time is extremely negative, the baseline search model cannot
generate amounts of wage dispersion similar to those observed empirically. Even
with a value for ρ of -1 the Mm ratio is less than 1.2. By requiring high values
of non-market time, accounting for cyclical fluctuations makes the frictional wage
dispersion problem worse.
Figure 1.1: Mm ratio and replacement ratios
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1.3 The Effects of Unemployment on Wages
Looking at how workers decide when to accept a job offer provides an immediate
solution to the frictional wage dispersion puzzle. Find a way of making unemploy-
ment more costly and wage dispersion will increase. Intuitively, with more costly
unemployment workers’ value of being unemployed decreases. Workers are willing
to accept lower offers as the value of their outside option —unemployment— is
lower. A lower reservation wage raises wage dispersion.
A way to achieve this is by introducing a loss of skills or human capital as-
sociated with unemployment. This mechanism delivers higher wage dispersion.
Workers lower their reservation wage to give themselves a better chance of leaving
unemployment and avoid the human capital losses incurred during unemployment.
In view of this, this thesis explores in detail how much wage dispersion can be gen-
erated through this mechanism.
There is empirical evidence that unemployment hurts the workers who suffer
it. Most of this evidence comes from the job displacement literature, which studies
the effects of job displacement —a particular case of unemployment— on wages
and other labor market outcomes. This literature finds that job displacement
causes large and very persistent earning losses to displaced workers. The focus
is slightly different than the one I take in later chapters, but provides one of the
sources of evidence on the effects of unemployment on wages. Therefore, I briefly
summarize the results in what follows.
1.3.1 Who are the displaced workers?
At the heart of the job displacement literature lies the concern of how structural
changes affect workers’ prospects. Structural changes may be brought about by
technological change, increasing competition from international trade, changes in
the composition of demand or changes in government regulation —such as en-
vironmental protection. Why is the literature concerned with the fortunes of
workers suffering losses from structural changes? If these changes benefit society
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as a whole, then the optimal policy should promote structural change while com-
pensating the workers who suffer losses in the process. Even to this day the US
Congress debates and approves legislation that compensates displaced workers,
usually through extended unemployment insurance (UI) protection. To determine
the magnitude of such public policy, we need to know who suffers losses and the
size of such losses.26
The job displacement literature focuses on workers with a high attachment
to their industry, firm or occupation. Displaced workers are thus a subset of all
unemployed workers. They have accumulated large amounts of specific human
capital. They are involuntarily separated from their jobs, and have little chance
of being recalled by their employer or finding a similar job within a reasonable
span of time. Because the job loss must be involuntary, quits, temporary layoffs
and firings for cause are not job displacements. As opposed to the empirical work
included in Chapter 2, this literature is therefore not as concerned with the effects
of unemployment on workers’ wages brought about by cyclical fluctuations.
To select workers who are attached to their job, the job displacement liter-
ature usually focuses on workers with a minimum tenure on a job —usually 6
years, although in some cases the minimum tenure is 3 years. The Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS) provides the following definition of a displaced worker. A
displaced worker is at least 20 years old, with more than 3 years of tenure with
their current employer,27 who has lost their job without a recall either due to
“slack work, abolition of position or shift, or plant closing or relocation”. How-
ever, most studies in the literature use an even stricter definition to make sure
that they select only displaced workers. For example, in most cases only plant
closures and mass-layoffs are considered.
26Fallick (1996) and Kletzer (1998) are excellent reviews of the early findings of the job dis-
placement literature. Couch and Placzek (2010) and von Wachter, Song and Manchester (2009)
provide more recent results.
27To give some idea of how many unemployed workers fall in that category, 58% of workers
being separated have less than 3 years of tenure.
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1.3.2 Data sources
Although the estimates vary with the data source, location and period of the
study, the job displacement literature finds unambiguous evidence that job dis-
placement causes large and persistent losses to displaced workers. Next, I discuss
the advantages and disadvantages of each data source. In the following section I
present the results by data source, as this allows for a better comparison between
the different studies and helps understand where the differences come from.
Each of the data sources comes with advantages and disadvantages. To help un-
derstand job displacement, starting in 1984 the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
began preparing a survey of displaced workers, the Displaced Workers Survey
(DWS). The information is drawn from another data collected by the BLS, the
Current Population Survey (CPS).
The main advantages of the DWS are its size and representativeness. Because it
draws from the CPS, it has access to information from 60,000 households. Further,
the CPS sample is representative of the US population, so the DWS is a national
sample. However, the DWS also has some important shortcomings. First, it
lacks a control or comparison group. One can only measure earnings losses as the
difference between pre-displacement and post-displacement earnings. But doing
so fails to account for the fact that earnings may have increased had displacement
not occurred. So to estimate the costs of displacement one needs to compare
post-displacement earnings to the level of earnings had displacement not occurred
—essentially the earnings of the non-displaced. Farber (1997) tries to control for
this by constructing a “synthetic” sample of non-displaced workers using the CPS.
Another important shortcoming of using the DWS can not be so easily corrected.
Because the DWS does not follow workers, it can not control for average earnings.
Presumably displaced workers may have lower average earnings than non-displaced
workers. If less productive workers are more likely to be displaced, then estimates
of the effects of job displacement may be biased.28
28Some relatively less important disadvantages of using the DWS include the following. The
DWS asks workers about displacements that have occurred in the past. As with any survey that
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To overcome the limitations of the DWS, some studies use the Panel Study
of Income Dynamics (PSID). It consists of a panel of US workers, and covers 30
years of data —1968 to 1997.29 Using the longitudinal dimension of the PSID,
these studies can control for fixed-effects, which controls for the different average
earnings of displaced and non-displaced.30 It is also a national sample, so the
results also apply to the whole of the US. The only shortcomings of the PSID is
its relatively small size and, as with any survey, measurement error.
To overcome the measurement error in DWS and PSID, many studies use ad-
ministrative records from US states used to calculate UI benefits.31 Further, the
sample sizes are very large, usually 5% of the state. Although both administrative
data and the PSID follow workers through time and allow for a control group,
administrative data provides some advantages over the PSID. It is a much bigger
sample, its income records are not top-coded and it includes information about
the employer. In particular, it provides the exact quarter of separation. However,
there are some disadvantages with using administrative data. Administrative data
is only available at the state level and for a given period of time, so there may
be concerns that the results apply only to certain states and not nationwide, and
to the time period of the study. Further, administrative data lacks demographic
information such as occupation, education or marital status, and lacks information
on hours worked.32 Finally, the reason for separation is not available in admin-
ask respondents to recall past events, it contains some mistakes. As von Wachter, Handwerker
and Hildreth (2007) show, the DWS tends to understate the number of job displacements.
Another problem is that in the DWS the post-displacement employment is identified as the job
at the time of the survey. The DWS is unable to identify if the worker had a different job
between displacement and the job at the time of the survey.
29Chapter 2 contains a more detailed description of the PSID.
30To see how important controlling for fixed-effects is, consider the following case. Using the
DWS, Gibbons and Katz (1991) find that earnings losses are lower for workers displaced because
of a plant closure or due to mass layoffs. They argue that this provides evidence that employers
take unemployment spells as a signal of low performance. When Stevens (1997) uses the PSID
the results are completely reverse. Mostly, the DWS fails to take into account that workers
employed at firms with plant closure and mass layoffs already start losing earnings before they
are displaced, which is what drives the result.
31The state’s administrative records used to construct the data are used to calculate firms’
tax liabilities, so they can be assumed free of measurement error.
32The only demographic information available is age and sex.
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istrative data. For this reason, studies using administrative data focus on mass
layoffs or plant closure.33
1.3.3 Empirical evidence from the job displacement liter-
ature
To give a general picture of the magnitude of the estimated losses, the DWS
studies find the lowest estimate for the earnings losses due to displacement —
not surprisingly given that they can not use fixed-effects. Estimates from the
PSID are larger but relatively closer to estimates from the DWS. Studies based
on administrative records tend to produce the largest estimated losses.
Administrative data.
The reference in the study of job displacement is the work by Jacobson, LaLonde
and Sullivan (1993) (JLS). Not only was their work the first to use administrative
data to study job displacement, their methodology has become the standard in
such studies.
The data in JLS comes from administrative records from the state of Penn-
sylvania which are used to calculate UI benefits, providing quarterly information
on earnings from 1974 through 1986. JLS focus on workers with least 6 years
of tenure with their employer. They further restrict to workers between 20 and
49 years old at the time of separation. Thus, the selected workers are likely to
possess large amounts of specific human capital. Now, their data does not provide
the reason for job separation, so they are unable to distinguish between voluntary
and involuntary quits. To overcome this shortcoming, JLS focus on mass-layoffs
and plant closure to make sure that the sample selected includes only involun-
tary separations. Using information about workers’ firms, workers are considered
separated from mass-layoff if their firm has experienced a 30% drop in employ-
ment around the time of the separation. As many firms in the manufacturing and
mining sector suffered plant closures and mass-layoffs in Pennsylvania during the
33As von Wachter, Handwerker and Hildreth (2007) show, administrative data tends to over-
state the number of job losses.
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period of the study, the problem with this selection is that it is likely picking up
workers that suffer larger earnings losses.
The statistical methodology in JLS represents another great contribution to
the the job displacement literature. They apply program evaluation techniques
to study the effects of job displacement on workers earnings, which in a nutshell
consists of using both fixed-effects and time trends. The statistical model used
follows this specification
lnYit = αi + γt +Xitβ +Ditδ + εit. (1.16)
In the above equation Yit represents earnings, αi is worker fixed-effects, quarterly
dummies γt capture time trends and Xit includes demographic variables, although
the only information available is sex and age —and their interactions. The Dit
dummies indicate when the displacement occurs, so the vector δ captures the
effects of displacement before and after displacement.
Using this statistical model, JLS find that displaced workers suffer 40% earning
losses after job displacement, and after 6 years earnings losses are still around 25%.
Earnings losses are large and persistent for all industries and for workers who
return to same industry, although losses are larger in manufacturing and mining
and for those who change sectors.
Because JLS use data from Pennsylvania during the 70s and 80s, they cover a
period of high unemployment in a state with a big manufacturing sector. Their
sample includes high seniority workers laid-off at a time with many plant closures
in the manufacturing and mining sector. This raises concerns about the limitation
of their results. Are the results representative of the US as a whole? How much
can we generalize them? Given these concerns, Couch and Placzek (2010) use
administrative data, similar to the one used in JLS, but from the state of Con-
necticut during the much calmer period from 1993 to 2004. They use the same
estimation techniques in JLS, and find large and persistent losses, but more in
line with evidence from the DWS or the PSID. When they only focus on workers
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separated in mass-layoffs, earnings losses are around 33% the year after separa-
tion, and 13 to 15% after 6 years from the year of separation. If all separators are
included, losses are still 33% after separation and 7 to 9% 6 years after separation.
As opposed to JLS, Couch and Placzek (2010) find that workers in finance, insur-
ance and real estate have the largest earnings losses 5 years after job loss, followed
by workers in business and professional services and workers in manufacturing.
Workers in education and health services suffer the smallest losses, with earnings
fully recovered in the long-run.
Although the study in Couch and Placzek (2010) provides evidence on the
costs of job displacement in more tranquil economic times, one still wonders how
general the results are. Further, both studies share a common problem, that
some workers leave the state and it is impossible to distinguish between workers
who have left the state and workers who simply have no earnings —both are
registered with zero earnings.34 It would also be interesting to find evidence of
the earnings losses beyond 6 years after job separations. In an ambitious project,
von Wachter, Song and Manchester (2009) use administrative data from the Social
Security to draw a large random sample of the entire US population. The data,
with similar characteristics to the previous two studies, contains employment and
earnings information covering 30 years of longitudinal data. Therefore, they follow
workers’ earnings losses for up to 20 years after job separations in the early 80s.
The long span of the study and the fact that it covers the entire US labor market
are major advantages of this study.
Although their results are preliminary, they also find very large and persistent
earnings losses from job displacement. Losses last over 20 years. The JLS is the
benchmark in their study. They use the same statistical methodology and also
focus on mass-layoffs to make sure they isolate job displacements. They consider
workers in their middle age who are separated between 1980 and 1986. There are
two differences with the JLS study. First, they only look at male workers, to avoid
34However, JLS find that workers who move within Pennsylvania suffer larger losses, so most
probably those who move out of state have larger losses too, so the estimates may not be biased.
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having to model labor force participation. Second, they also estimate losses for a
sample of workers with shorter tenure at the time of job loss —3 years instead of
6 years.
They find that displaced workers suffer 30% immediate earnings losses, 20%
losses 10 years after separation, 10% 15 years after, and that losses are not faded
after 20 years. The results are very robust. They hold if one controls for firm
or industry fixed effects, and show that losses are large for all age and industry
groups. Although, as the authors mention, these results are preliminary.
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
The reference in the study of job displacement using the PSID is Stevens (1997).
The advantage with the PSID is that it is longitudinal, so Stevens (1997) can
use the same estimation technique as JLS of fixed effects combined with time-
trends. However, it is not possible to identify if a worker is laid off or fired due
to performance. So displacement is identified as involuntary termination of a
position, and includes workers who lose their jobs due plant or business closing,
but also those who are laid off and fired. Temporary layoffs and end of temporary
jobs are not considered displacements. As the PSID does not provide information
on firms, it is impossible to focus on mass-layoffs and plant closures.
As with results from administrative data, Stevens (1997) finds large and persis-
tent losses. Immediate earnings losses are around 25% at the time of displacement,
15% a year after and between 7% and 12% 7 years or more later —the last period
is 10 years after displacement. A similar pattern emerges from wages, falling 12%
at time of displacement, around 8% a year after, 9% 7 years after separation and
remain roughly the same up until 10 years after displacement.
Also using the PSID, Ruhm (1991) finds between 14 and 18% earnings losses
at the time displacement, and between 10 and 13% after 4 years of separation.
Displaced Workers Survey (DWS).
Studies based on the DWS include Carrington (1993), Farber (1997) and Topel
(1990). These studies do not include a control group, except for Farber (1997), who
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constructs a ‘synthetic’ control group of non-displaced workers based on the CPS.
These DWS studies estimate earnings losses to be between 9% and 16% losses from
displacement. In Farber (1997), when a control group is used estimated losses are
larger, as losses go from 9% to 12%.
National Longitudinal of Youth (NLSY).
Using similar techniques to JLS, work by Kletzer and Fairlie (2003) use the Na-
tional Longitudinal of Youth (NLSY), a panel of young workers, to look at the
effects of displacement on young workers’ earnings. Presumably these workers
should have little specific human capital. However, the authors still find big losses.
Earnings losses are around 18% a year after displacement, and 9% 5 years after.
When looking at wages, losses are 10% a year after separation, and 21.2% 5 years
after separation. Interestingly, losses are bigger for college graduates, with 25%
earnings losses in the fifth year after separation. However, in the case of young
workers Kletzer and Fairlie (2003) show that these losses mostly reflect missed
opportunities to accumulate skills early in the career, as young workers out of
work miss on steep earnings growth.
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1.4 Mathematical Derivations
1.4.1 Mm ratio in the Pissarides random-matching model
Let U and W be the asset values of being unemployed and employed, and J and
V those of a filled position and a vacancy. Workers get wages w(p). The following
asset equations hold
rU = b+ f
∫ pmax
p∗
(W (p)− U)dF (p) (1.17)
rW (p) = w(p)− s(W (p)− U) (1.18)
rJ(p) = p− w(p)− sJ(p) (1.19)
rV = −k + q
∫ pmax
p∗
J(p)dF (p), (1.20)
where k is the cost of posting a vacancy. Assuming Nash Bargaining (NB) of the
match surplus gives that
βJ(p) = (1− β)(W (p)− U). (1.21)
Using the asset equations and the NB rule I get the following expression for wages
w(p) = (1− β)rU + βp. (1.22)
The minimum observed wage corresponds to the wage evaluated at p∗. I denote it
by w∗, i.e. w∗ = w(p∗). Since W (p∗) = U , and J(p∗) = 0, the following properties
hold
p∗ = rU (1.23)
w∗ = p∗. (1.24)
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In particular, combining wages in (1.22) and (1.23) gives that
w(p) = p∗ + β(p− p∗). (1.25)
Using the asset equations for U and W gives that
w∗ = b+ f
∫ pmax
p∗
(W (p)− U)dF (p). (1.26)
Substituting (1.22) into the the asset equation for W (p) gives that
W (p)− U = β(p− p
∗)
r + s
. (1.27)
Therefore, combining (1.27) and (1.26) gives
w∗ = b+
f
r + s
∫ pmax
p∗
β(p− p∗)dF (p), (1.28)
which after adding and subtracting p∗ and dividing and multiplying by 1− F (p∗)
in the integrand on the right-hand side gives
w∗
(
1 +
f ∗
r + s
)
= b+
f ∗
r + s
∫ pmax
p∗
w(p)
dF (p)
1− F (p∗) . (1.29)
As b = ρw¯ and
w¯ =
∫ pmax
p∗
w(p)
dF (p)
(1− F (p∗) , (1.30)
I get that
w∗
(
1 +
f ∗
r + s
)
= w¯
(
ρ+
f ∗
r + s
)
. (1.31)
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The above equation gives the expression for the Mm ratio in the text
Mm =
w¯
w∗
=
1 + f
∗
r+s
ρ+ f
∗
r+s
. (1.32)
1.4.2 Unemployment fluctuations in the canonical search
model
The asset equations for U , W , J and V are given by
rU = b+ f(θ)(W − U) (1.33)
rW = w − s(W − U) (1.34)
rJ = p− w − s(J − V ) (1.35)
rV = −k + q(θ)(J − V ) (1.36)
There is free entry in the market for vacancies, so V = 0 yields
J =
k
q(θ)
(1.37)
Using the asset equation for J gives to substitute J in the above equation gives
p− w
r + s
=
k
q(θ)
. (1.38)
Nash Bargaining implies that
(1− β)(W − U) = βJ. (1.39)
Using the asset equations for W and J and the above Nash sharing rule gives
w = rU + β(p− rU − (r + s)V ). (1.40)
47
Rearranging and substituting (1.38) gives the following expression for wages
w = (1− β)b+ β(p+ θk). (1.41)
Equilibrium θ is determined by free entry condition (1.38) and wages (1.41). Sub-
stituting the wage (1.41) into (1.38) and rearranging gives that θ is the solution
to the following equation
(1− β)(p− b)
k
=
r + s
q(θ)
+ βθ (1.42)
which is equation (1.13) in the text, and is the same equation as in page 36 of
Shimer (2005) with no stochastic shocks (λ = 0). I use εθ and εw to denote the
elasticities of θ and w with respect to p, and η to denote the elasticity of q(θ)
with respect to θ, i.e. η = −q′(θ)θ/q(θ), as q′(.) < 0. Taking logs of the free
entry condition (1.38) and differentiating with respect to p gives equation εθ as a
function of εw as given by (1.11) in the text
1− dw
dp
p− w =
η
θ
dθ
dp
(1.43)
εθ =
1
η
p− εww
p− w . (1.44)
This corresponds to expression , which is the same as equation (20) in Pissarides
(2009).
I use now the notation ε˜θ to denote the elasticity of θ with respect to net labor
productivity p − b. Taking log and derivative of (1.42) and rearranging gives the
expression (1.14) for ε˜θ
ε˜θ =
r + s+ βf(θ)
η(r + s) + βf(θ)
. (1.45)
The above is the same value as in Shimer (2005) with no shocks, only with η instead
of 1− η, as in Shimer (2005) η is the elasticity of f(θ) and not q(θ). Following the
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same procedure gives the elasticity with respect to labor productivity
εθ =
r + s+ βf(θ)
η(r + s) + βf(θ)
.
p
p− b. (1.46)
Unemployment evolves according to the following transition equation
u˙ = f(θ)u− s(1− u), (1.47)
which gives the following steady-state unemployment
u =
s
s+ f(θ)
. (1.48)
The above equation defines what is known as the Beveridge Curve, and describes
a negative relationship between unemployment and vacancies.
Shimer (2005) solves a stochastic version of this model. All equations are
similar, only that labor market tightness θp,s equation (6) gives
r + s+ λ
q(θp,s)
+ βθp,s = (1− β)p− z
k
+ λEp,s(
1
θp′,s′
). (1.49)
Solving the above equation numerically gives the values for labor market tightness
θp,s. The rest of the equations are the same.
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Chapter 2
Unemployment History and
Frictional Wage Dispersion
A large number of papers in labor economics explore the determinants of wages.
The effects on wages of worker characteristics, such as education or tenure, are well
documented. However, worker characteristics can only explain a fraction of the
observed wage dispersion in the data. Once one controls for these characteristics,
the residual still displays a large amount of dispersion. Therefore, observationally
similar workers are paid different wages.
Search models of the labor market can explain why apparently similar workers
are paid different wages. In these models, workers adopt a reservation wage strat-
egy when looking for jobs. Job offers are only available with a given frequency, so
workers accept a job offer if the associated wage is above their reservation value.
This acceptance rule by workers generates wage dispersion, even among identi-
cal workers.1 However, recent work by Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2011)
shows that baseline search models fail to generate significant wage dispersion.
The authors use the ratio between the mean and minimum wage observation, the
mean-min or Mm ratio, to measure wage dispersion. In search models the Mm
ratio is a function of labor-market flows and preference parameters, for which re-
1The literature uses the term frictional wage dispersion to describe the wage dispersion among
identical workers that arises from search frictions. For example, see Mortensen (2005).
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liable estimates exist. These estimates imply an Mm ratio in search models of
around 1.05, implying that the mean wage is 5% higher than the minimum ob-
served wage. By contrast, the residual in a Mincerian regression, with as many
controls as possible, gives a 50-10 percentile ratio between 1.7 and 1.9. Given that
this 50-10 percentile ratio is a reasonable empirical counterpart to the Mm ratio,
the gap between the two values is remarkable.2
This paper introduces a search model in which workers lose some human cap-
ital or skills during unemployment. Workers become less productive while they
remain unemployed, so wages depend on workers’ unemployment histories —their
cumulative time spent in unemployment. I use this model to address the follow-
ing question: What happens to wage dispersion among identical workers if they
lose human capital during unemployment? The model generates further wage dis-
persion compared to baseline search models because workers adjust their search
behavior. The intuition is the following. Unemployment “hurts” workers. They
lose human capital during unemployment, which depreciates their wages. Since
workers are aware that longer unemployment spells lead to larger wage losses, they
are willing to accept lower wages to leave unemployment more quickly. With a
lower reservation wage, wage dispersion increases among identical workers.3
The paper shows that wage dispersion increases significantly if workers lose
some human capital during unemployment. I derive an expression of the Mm
ratio in the model that does not rely on any assumption about the underlying
distribution of match productivities. The Mm ratio is uniquely determined by a
set of parameters, for which reliable estimates exist.4 To illustrate the amount of
wage dispersion generated by the model, I compare its implied Mm ratio to the
one in the baseline search model and the data. Using estimates from the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), the Mm ratio in the model with loss of human
2Using the 10th percentile reduces some of the measurement error associated with the mini-
mum observation.
3To avoid repetition I use wage dispersion to refer to wage dispersion among ex-ante identical
workers, the focus of the paper.
4In their work Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2011) find that in most search models one
can express the Mm ratio as a function of a few parameters.
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capital has a value of 1.15. By contrast, the Mm ratio in the baseline search model
is 1.04. In the PSID the 50-10 percentile ratio is 1.34. A similar picture emerges
if one uses estimates from the Current Population Survey (CPS) for the labor
market flows, as given by Shimer (2005). The Mm ratio has a value of 1.22 in
the model with loss of human capital, whereas for the baseline search model the
value is 1.05. Empirically, the 50-10 percentile ratio is between 1.7 and 1.9. These
results imply that, while the baseline model explains around 11% of the residual
wage dispersion in the PSID, and 6% of that in the CPS, the mechanism of the
model accounts for around 45% of the wage dispersion in the PSID, and 28% of
that in the CPS.
The model incorporates workers’ loss of human capital during unemployment
in the following way. Workers’ human capital depreciates at a constant rate while
they stay in unemployment.5 This feature is introduced in an otherwise typical
search model, the Pissarides (1985) random matching model. Each match between
the firm and the worker has a match-specific productivity. In contrast to the
standard model, the productivity of the match further depends on the worker’s
human capital, which is uniquely determined by workers’ unemployment history.
When the worker and the firm meet, if the match-specific productivity is above a
reservation productivity value they start to produce.
I assume that unemployment benefits are proportional to workers’ human cap-
ital. As a result, benefits gradually decrease while workers stay unemployed.
There is no reason to believe that benefits should satisfy this property, but as-
suming it greatly simplifies the solution.6 However, in the paper I also solve the
model with constant unemployment benefits, using numerical methods, and show
that it generates very similar amounts of wage dispersion. With proportional
benefits, a closed form solution exists. The Mm ratio is independent of any dis-
tributional assumption for match productivities. Evaluating the Mm ratio only
5This human capital should not be confused with the human capital given, for example, by
education, which is observable and thus controlled for in Mincerian regressions.
6A number of papers use similar assumptions to simplify the derivations. For example, see
Mortensen and Pissarides (1998), Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002b), or Kenneth Burdett, Carlos
Carrillo-Tudela and Melvyn G. Coles (2011).
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requires knowledge of a few parameters, namely the depreciation rate of human
capital during unemployment, the labor market flow rates, the interest rate, and
the replacement ratio.
The paper contains some empirical work to quantify the amount of wage dis-
persion consistent with the data. I use the PSID, one of the large panels of US
workers, to construct workers’ unemployment history and estimate the rate at
which they lose human capital during unemployment. The regressions results
indicate that an additional month of unemployment history is associated with
around 1.2% wage loss. The Mm ratio in the model is compared to the 50-10
percentile ratio of the residual in the Mincerian regression.
This paper is motivated by the findings in Hornstein, Krusell and Violante
(2011) that baseline search models fail to generate significant wage dispersion.
The paper is also related to two literatures.
First, a large empirical literature explores the effects of job displacement on
workers’ earnings. Chapter 1 summarized the findings of this literature. The
magnitude of the earnings losses are much larger than those of this paper. The
difference in their estimates comes from their focus on displaced workers, a smaller
set of unemployed workers who usually suffer larger losses.7 Further, because these
studies are concerned about the effects of displacement, they do not control for
occupation or industry sector. If both displaced and non-displaced workers suf-
fer losses because of a declining industry the effect on both displaced and non-
displaced workers is included in their estimates, as they argue this matters for
policy.8 Using the estimates from the job displacement literature would only
increase wage dispersion, so this difference is not problematic. However, the em-
7Displaced workers are a subset of all unemployed workers. The formal definition says that
displaced workers are fairly attached to their job and are involuntarily separated from it, with
little chance of being recalled by their employer or finding a similar job within a reasonable span
of time. To select workers who are attached to their job, the job displacement literature usually
focuses on workers with a minimum tenure on a job —6 years of tenure for most studies, and at
least 3 years. The job loss must also be involuntary, so quits, temporary layoffs and firings for
cause are not job displacements.
8That is, if for example opening to trade hurts both displaced and non-displaced workers in
a particular sector, estimated losses should include these. Nevertheless, the studies report how
earnings losses vary per sector.
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pirical work in this paper is better suited for the model for the following reasons.
First, only some unemployed workers are displaced. Wage losses coming from
cyclical fluctuations are not included in the job displacement literature. Second,
because my empirical work focuses on how the wage loss depends on workers’ un-
employment history, it provides a better mapping between the empirical estimates
and the corresponding variable in the model.9 Finally, I do want to control for
industry and occupation, because the focus of the paper is wage dispersion among
identical workers.
The second literature introduces the loss of human capital during unemploy-
ment into search models. Aside from modeling differences, these papers answer
different questions. Lars Ljungqvist and Thomas J. Sargent (1998) offer an ex-
planation for the high unemployment in Europe compared to the US.10 Christo-
pher A. Pissarides (1992) finds that unemployment becomes more persistent when
unemployed workers lose skills and studies the implications for long term unem-
ployment. Robert Shimer and Ivan Werning (2006) and Nicola Pavoni (2011)
study unemployment insurance. In Kenneth Burdett, Carlos Carrillo-Tudela and
Melvyn G. Coles (2011) workers accumulate human capital when they are em-
ployed, but there is no loss during unemployment. Workers can search on-the-job,
and employed and unemployed workers receive job offers at the same rate.11 Be-
cause they focus on explaining why younger workers move jobs more frequently
and are more likely to experience wage gains, they calibrate the parameters tak-
ing the empirical Mm ratio as a target.12 In Melvyn Coles and Adrian Masters
(2000) long-term unemployment arises endogenously. They also introduce train-
9von Wachter, Song and Manchester (2009) find that losses are smaller for workers displaced
at the peak of the recovery of the late 80s. This further suggests that losses could depend on the
length of the unemployment spell, as in a recovery workers find jobs quicker and unemployment
durations are lower.
10See also the related papers by Wouter J. den Haan, Christian Haefke and Garey Ramey
(2005), and Lars Ljungqvist and Thomas J. Sargent (2007) and (2008).
11This assumption of same job offer rates implies very large Mm ratios, but it is at odds with
the data.
12Whereas I proceed differently. The Mm is not a target in a calibration exercise. The model
shows a direct link between the parameters in the model and the dispersion of wages. I estimate
the parameters from the data, and use them to quantify the dispersion of wages consistent with
those estimates.
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ing, so workers can recover some of the lost human capital when they start a job.
In equilibrium, firms train workers until they regain all of their lost human cap-
ital.13 Their framework suggests that job creation subsidies are a more efficient
policy than training for the unemployed. The question in this paper is different. I
implement the effects of unemployment history on wages to explore the capacity
of search models to generate wage dispersion.
The paper starts with the model, and continues with the empirical work using
the PSID. Next, using numerical methods, I derive the solution for the case of
constant benefits during unemployment, which to my knowledge is not a widely
used approach.14 I show that both models generate very similar amounts of wage
dispersion. Finally, I assess the amount of wage dispersion consistent with the
CPS.
2.1 The Labor Market
The model builds on the random matching model of Pissarides (1985). I introduce
the assumption that workers gradually lose human capital during unemployment
at a constant rate δ. The loss depends on the time the worker spends in unem-
ployment. Throughout the paper the term unemployment history refers to the
cumulative duration of unemployment spells. I use γ to denote unemployment
history.
Given the focus on residual wage dispersion, human capital in the model is
net of other controls such as education. Thus, human capital depends only on
unemployment history. I denote workers’ human capital by h(γ). Normalizing
h(0) = 1, the constant depreciation rate during unemployment implies human
capital is given by h(γ) = e−δγ. Although workers do not accumulate human cap-
ital when they are employed, the model is isomorphic to a model in which workers
13Although the empirical evidence shows important wage losses after becoming unemployed.
Louis S. Jacobson, Robert J. LaLonde and Daniel G. Sullivan (2005) find that displaced workers
regain some lost earnings if they receive training, but they remain far from recovering all lost
earnings.
14Coles and Masters (2000) do consider constant benefits during unemployment, but their
solution is simplified by the retraining assumption.
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accumulate human capital during employment and lose it during unemployment,
because what matters for workers’ search decision is that the human capital gap
widens between employment and unemployment.15
Workers search for jobs, and firms for job applicants. I assume that the worker
and the firm draw a productivity parameter p from a known distribution F (p)
when they meet. The productivity of the match is determined by the product of
match-specific productivity p and the worker’s human capital h(γ), i.e. by h(γ)p.
Following the approach in Pissarides (2000), labor market flows are determined
by a matching function m(V, U), where V denotes vacancies and U unemployed
workers. Market tightness θ is defined as the ratio of vacancies to unemployed
workers, θ = V/U . I assume the usual conditions for the matching function, that
it is increasing in both its arguments and concave, and that it displays constant
returns. Workers find jobs at a rate f(θ) = m(V, U)/U , and firms receive appli-
cants at a rate q(θ) = m(V, U)/V . The properties of the matching function imply
that f(θ) = θq(θ). If the labor market is tight (θ high, many vacancies for a given
number of unemployed workers) workers find jobs more easily, and firms have more
difficulty finding applicants. In other words, ∂f/∂θ ≥ 0, and ∂q/∂θ ≤ 0. Separa-
tions occur at an exogenous rate s. The paper only considers the steady-state, so
for simplicity I drop θ from the notation.
Workers are identical when they first join the labor market. However, they
find and lose jobs, so in equilibrium they have different unemployment histories.
I assume that workers leave the labor force at a rate µ, and are replaced by new
workers with zero unemployment history. This allows for a stationary distribution
of unemployment histories. I denote the distribution of unemployment histories
among unemployed workers by GU(γ), and among employed workers by GE(γ).
These distributions are endogenous.
15Returns to work experience are implicit. If an unemployed worker were employed she would
be accumulating human capital. The parameter δ captures both this foregone human capital
accumulation and the loss of human capital from being unemployed. More formally, the two
models are isomorphic because in a model in which workers accumulate human capital during
employment and lose it during unemployment, the equation that determines the reservation
productivity is the same as in the model of the paper.
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I assume that unemployed workers receive payments bh(γ). With this assump-
tion, payments during unemployment are proportional to workers’ human capital
level h(γ), and decrease at the rate δ while they remain unemployed. This as-
sumption greatly simplifies the analysis, and allows for a closed-form solution. In
section 2.3, I solve the model with constant b numerically, and assess how this
assumption changes the results.
2.1.1 Asset equations for workers and firms
Unemployed workers accept a job if the match-specific productivity is above their
reservation productivity. Given that human capital decreases while the worker
stays unemployed, the reservation productivity may depend on unemployment
history γ. In section 2.1.2 I show that Nash Bargaining implies that the reservation
productivity is the same for workers and firms. To avoid unnecessary complications
in notation, I denote this reservation productivity by p∗γ.
Let U(γ) be the value function of an unemployed worker with unemployment
history γ, and W (γ, p) the value function of an employed worker in a job with
match-specific productivity p. If r is the interest rate, the asset equation for the
unemployed worker is
(r + µ)U(γ) = bh(γ) + f
∫ pmax
p∗γ
(W (γ, y)− U(γ))dF (y) + ∂U(γ)
∂γ
. (2.1)
The left-hand side of (2.1) represents the returns to being unemployed with unem-
ployment history γ, taking into account that workers leave the labor force at rate µ
(so r+µ is the effective discount rate). Consider now the right-hand side. The first
term corresponds to the payments workers receive while unemployed. The second
term captures the option value of being unemployed, namely that at rate f the
worker receives a job offer with expected gain
∫ pmax
p∗γ
(W (γ, y)− U(γ))dF (y). The
last term captures the capital depreciation of the value of unemployment U(γ),
caused by the depreciation of human capital while the worker stays unemployed.
Wages depend on the human capital of the worker and the match-specific
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productivity. I use w(γ, p) to denote the wage of a worker with unemployment
history γ, and employed in a job with match-specific productivity p. The asset
equation for the employed worker is
(r + µ)W (γ, p) = w(γ, p)− s(W (γ, p)− U(γ)). (2.2)
The intuition behind this equation is similar. The worker receives a wage w(γ, p),
and at a rate s the worker loses the job, which carries a net loss of size W (γ, p)−
U(γ).
To find successful candidates, firms post vacancies at cost k. Remember that
later I prove that the reservation productivity p∗γ is the same for firms and workers.
So the firm hires a worker with unemployment history γ if p ≥ p∗γ. The firm
receives applications from unemployed workers with γ given by the endogenous
distribution GU(γ). The asset equation for vacancies is
rV = −k + q
∫ ∞
0
(∫ pmax
p∗γ
(J(γ, y)− V )dF (y)
)
dGU(γ). (2.3)
I assume free entry in the market for vacancies, meaning that firms post vacancies
until V = 0.
When production begins, a worker produces h(γ)p. Having to pay wages, the
firm receives h(γ)p− w(γ, p). The asset equation for a filled job position is
(r + µ)J(γ, p) = h(γ)p− w(γ, p)− s(J(γ, p)− V ). (2.4)
The intuition is similar. The left-hand side represents the returns to a filled
position. The right-hand side captures that the filled position produces a flow
h(γ)p− w(γ, p), and that at rate s the job is destroyed, with a net loss of J − V .
2.1.2 Reservation productivity and wages
In the next few paragraphs I find two results about reservation productivities.
First, given the assumption that unemployment benefits and the productivity of
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matches are proportional to human capital, I prove that the reservation produc-
tivity p∗γ is independent of γ. This simplifies greatly the analysis. Second, I find
an expression that links wages and the reservation productivity.
I assume that wages are determined by Nash Bargaining. When the worker
and the firm meet, if p ≥ p∗γ production begins and they split the surplus. Given
a bargaining strength β, the wage is the solution to
w(γ, p) = arg max
w(γ,p)
(W (γ, p)− U(γ))β(J(γ, p)− V )1−β. (2.5)
The surplus of the match is given by J(γ, p)−V +W (γ, p)−U(γ). Nash Bargaining
implies that the worker gets a share β of the surplus, and the firm a share 1− β.
Combining (2.5) and the asset equations for the worker and the firm (2.2) and
(2.4) gives the following result:
βJ(γ, p) = (1− β)(W (γ, p)− U(γ)). (2.6)
Two properties about p∗γ are useful. Consider a firm and a worker that meet
and draw a productivity parameter p. Accepting the offer has a value W (γ, p) to
the worker. If he rejects the offer the worker walks away with U(γ). It follows
that p∗γ satisfies
W (γ, p∗γ) = U(γ). (2.7)
Similarly, if production starts the match has a value J(γ, p) to the firm. If the
firm does not hire the worker it gets the value of the vacancy V = 0. Thus, the
reservation productivity p∗γ satisfies
J(γ, p∗γ) = 0. (2.8)
The asset equations (2.2) and (2.4), and the sharing rule (2.6) give the first
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expression for w(γ, p):
w(γ, p) = βh(γ)p+ (1− β)(r + µ)U(γ) (2.9)
Evaluating the asset equations for the employed worker and the filled job position
(2.2) and (2.4) at p = p∗γ, and using (2.7) and (2.8) gives
(r + µ)U(γ) = w(γ, p∗γ), (2.10)
h(γ)p∗γ = w(γ, p
∗
γ). (2.11)
Combining these two properties gives
(r + µ)U(γ) = h(γ)p∗γ. (2.12)
Finally, (2.9) and (2.12) give the first expression linking wages w(γ, p) and p∗γ:
w(γ, p) = h(γ)(βp+ (1− β)p∗γ). (2.13)
The following result simplifies the model.
Proposition 1. The reservation productivity p∗γ is independent of γ, i.e. p
∗
γ = p
∗.
The proof is included in appendix 2.5. The assumption of proportional benefits
bh(γ) is crucial for this result. Intuitively, in the wage bargaining process the
worker expects to be compensated for giving up U(γ). While the value of output
h(γ)p decreases with unemployment, the value of benefits bh(γ) does too. The
first process raises the reservation productivity, as better matches are required if
h(γ) is low, and the second lowers it. Given that all quantities are proportional to
h(γ) these two opposing effects cancel out, and the reservation productivity stays
constant. I formally prove this by guessing a solution and proving that the guess is
correct. By contrast, as I show in section 2.3, when benefits are constant this result
disappears. With constant benefits b, the worker expects to be compensated for
giving up b, but the value of expected output h(γ)p decreases with unemployment.
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Workers and firms then require better matches for longer unemployment histories.
Proposition 1 gives the following wage expression
w(γ, p) = h(γ)(βp+ (1− β)p∗). (2.14)
Next, I derive the Mm ratio to assess the amount of wage dispersion generated
by the model.
2.1.3 The Mm ratio
As work by Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2011) shows, in most search models
one can derive the Mm ratio without assuming any distribution for match-specific
productivities F (p). This property represents a major advantage over other mea-
sures of wage dispersion, such as the variance. I show that the Mm ratio in
the model displays the same property, and is independent of the distributional
assumption for F (p).16
Similar to Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2011), I define the replacement
ratio as the ratio between unemployment benefits and the average wage, and
denote it by ρ. Workers receive different unemployment benefits depending on
their human capital. As a result, to find the replacement ratio in the labor market,
I compare average benefits with average wages. More specifically, ρ is given by
ρ = b ¯h(γ)/w¯, where ¯h(γ) = E(h(γ)) is the average value of h(γ), and w¯ is the
average wage, which is given by
w¯ = E(w(γ, p)|p ≥ p∗) =
∫ ∞
0
(∫ pmax
p∗
w(γ, p)
dF (p)
1− F (p∗)
)
dGE(γ). (2.15)
Taking expectations of wage expression (2.14), I find that w¯ = ¯h(γ)(βp¯+(1−β)p∗),
16One of the disadvantages of using the Mm ratio is its reliance on the minimum observation,
which suffers from measurement error. However, as suggested by Hornstein, Krusell and Violante
(2011), one can use the 10th percentile observation instead to minimize measurement error.
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where p¯ = E(p|p ≥ p∗) is defined in a similar way
p¯ =
∫ pmax
p∗
p
dF (p)
1− F (p∗) . (2.16)
This implies that
b = ρ(βp¯+ (1− β)p∗). (2.17)
Equation (2.14) shows that wages are proportional to the human capital level
h(γ). Taking the logarithm of (2.14), and using that log(h(γ)) = −δγ, shows that
log wages are linear in unemployment history γ, with a coefficient δ. Therefore,
h(γ) can be removed from wages by controlling for unemployment history in a
Mincerian wage regression —this is done in the next section, which contains the
empirical part of the paper. Given the focus of the paper on residual wage dis-
persion, I focus on the dispersion in βp + (1 − β)p∗. Therefore, the Mm ratio is
given by
Mm = (βp¯+ (1− β)p∗)/p∗. (2.18)
To derive the Mm ratio, use asset equation (2.4), and wage expression (2.14) to
find
(r + µ+ s)J(γ, p) = (1− β)h(γ)(p− p∗). (2.19)
Substituting equation (2.19), the Nash Bargaining sharing rule (2.6), and (2.12)
into the equation for U(γ) given by (2.1) implies the following expression
r + µ+ δ
r + µ
p∗ = b+ βf
∫ pmax
p∗
p− p∗
r + µ+ s
dF (p). (2.20)
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The above equation allows for a simple expression of the Mm ratio
Mm =
r+µ+δ
r+µ
+ f
∗
r+µ+s
ρ+ f
∗
r+µ+s
, (2.21)
where f ∗ = f(1−F (p∗)) is the job finding probability.17 Appendix 2.5 shows how
to derive the Mm ratio from (2.20) in more detail.
Expression (2.21) shows that the Mm ratio measures wage dispersion without
relying on any distributional assumption for F (p). While it depends on the job
finding rate f ∗ = f(1−F (p∗)), this rate is eventually determined by the data, and
no functional assumption for F (p) is required. Further, substituting δ = 0 yields
the same Mm ratio as in the Pissarides (1985) model.18
The relationship between the job finding and separation rates and the Mm
ratio is intuitive. With higher f ∗, workers find jobs more quickly, and the value of
workers’ outside option increases. Workers respond to the higher outside option
by increasing their reservation productivities, which lowers wage dispersion and
the Mm ratio. The Mm ratio is thus decreasing in f ∗. The separation rate has
the opposite effect, so higher separation rates increase the Mm ratio. Finally, a
higher δ makes unemployment more costly for workers. Workers are willing to
lower their reservation productivity to leave unemployment more rapidly, which
increases the Mm ratio.
By using the Mm ratio, one only requires knowledge of r, ρ, s, f ∗, µ and
δ to assess the amount of wage dispersion in the model. Reliable estimates for
these parameters can be found from data. In the next section, I use micro data
to estimate them and quantify the size of wage dispersion in the model.
17While job offers arrive at rate f , the worker accepts them if p ≥ p∗, which happens with
probability 1− F (p∗). Therefore, the job finding rate is given by f∗ = f(1− F (p∗)).
18With δ = 0 the Mm ratio is given by Mm = (1+ f
∗
r+µ+s )/(ρ+
f∗
r+µ+s ), which is the expression
Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2011) find for baseline search models. Further, if δ = 0 one
can see that the model corresponds to the Pissarides (1985) model.
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2.2 Empirical work
I use data from the 1968-1997 waves of the PSID.19 Appendix 2.6 describes the
sample selection. The main motivation for using the PSID is that it follows workers
over time. In the model wages depend on workers’ unemployment history. Given
the panel structure of the PSID, I construct workers’ unemployment history to
estimate δ. The panel structure has the further advantage of allowing for fixed
effects estimation. There may be some unobserved characteristics that make some
workers more productive than others. If less productive workers are more likely to
be unemployed, the estimation may be biased. By controlling for workers’ constant
unobserved characteristics, fixed effects estimation solves this problem. Finally,
one concern may be that when a worker joins the sample, previous unemployment
history is unknown. Fixed-effects again solves this problem. When a worker joins
the sample, prior unemployment history remains constant in later observations,
so worker fixed effects controls for it. This is another reason for preferring fixed-
effects regression over cross-sectional.
2.2.1 Estimating δ
In the model, δ captures the percentage wage loss caused by unemployment history,
which consists of the accumulated unemployment spells of the worker. The PSID
asks workers how many weeks they were unemployed in the previous year.20 I
use the answers to this question to construct unemployment history. I include
this information into the variable Unhis, which contains unemployment history in
months. To estimate δ, I regress the log of wages on Unhis and other covariates
19The PSID collected data biennially after 1997 for funding reasons. Therefore, after 1997
information on the number of weeks in unemployment is unavailable for the years without in-
terviews. See Appendix 2.6 for more details.
20Most PSID questions are retrospective, and ask the household head about the year prior to
the interview. For example, in the 1981 wave the PSID asks about the income or hours worked
during 1980.
64
X, as in the following expression
logW = −δ Unhis+ βX + ε. (2.22)
In the regression above, δ gives the percentage wage loss for an additional month
of unemployment history. Taking the logarithm of the equation for wages in (2.14)
shows that log wages are linear in unemployment history γ, with a coefficient δ.
Therefore, wage equation (2.14) is the theoretical equivalent to equation (2.22).
As the estimated δ captures the exact same effect on wages that δ has in the model,
this empirical strategy provides an estimate that can be consistently entered in
the model.
The results are included in Table 2.1. Column (1) of Table 2.1 corresponds
to the regression with worker fixed-effects. Fixed effects regression controls for
all constant characteristics, so in column (1) X also includes potential experience
(cubic), regional dummies, and one-digit occupational dummies.21 The regression
gives an estimate for δ of −.0122. I use this value in the rest of the paper.
To check the robustness of the estimate for δ, I employ a variety of alternative
specifications for the regression in (2.22). The results, shown in Table 2.1, are very
robust. Column (2) gives δ in the cross-sectional regression, without fixed-effects.
Not having fixed-effects, I add several time-invariant regressors toX. CovariatesX
in column (2) include the covariates in column (1), plus race dummies, educational
dummies and year-dummies. Column (3) corresponds to the same regression as in
column (1), but with two-digit occupation. The regression has fewer observations
because it covers only the years 1975-1997, as the PSID did not record two-digit
occupations before 1975.22 However, running column (1) for the same years as in
21One can also add educational dummies. The results do not change.
22The PSID recontacted heads of households to get the three-digit occupation for 1968-1974,
and included the updated data in a supplement. However, while having some advantages, using
this supplement also has some disadvantages. Some people could not be recontacted, so one
needs to drop some individuals to use this supplement. If recontact was possible, the PSID asks
about events that happened many years before. In any case, as the text points out, one or two
digit regressions give very similar results for δ over the period for which both are available, so
this is not an issue.
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Table 2.1: The effects of unemployment history on wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Unhis -.0122 -.0107 -.0143 -.0164 -.0101
(.00043) (.00098) (.00057) (.00082) (.00034)
Unhis2 .0001
(.00002)
Occ 1-Digit yes yes yes yes
Occ 2-Digit yes
FE yes yes yes
Heckman yes
N 34,542 42,203 25,178 34,542 43,260
LR test, χ2(1) 157.28
Notes.- Unhis in months. Robust standard errors (clustered by worker). Numbers in brackets are
standard errors. The χ2(1) is the likelihood ratio test for selection bias. Section 2.2 describes the
different columns.
column (3) gives very similar results. Column (4) includes the quadratic Unhis2.
Including industry does not change the results.
2.2.2 Estimating labor-market transition rates
I now estimate the labor market transition rates. Why not use existing estimates
from the literature, such as the values from the CPS in Shimer (2005)? To test
the explanatory power of the model, one should compare the Mm ratio in the
model with its empirical counterpart in the PSID. The model shows a direct link
between labor market flows and the Mm ratio. If flows are different in the PSID
(as they are), using the flows from the CPS would provide a wrong test of the
model. Although the evaluation of wage dispersion in this section is very specific
to the PSID, later in the paper I explore the amount of wage dispersion in the
CPS, and use the values in Shimer (2005).
The estimation strategy is as follows. The PSID gives the worker’s employ-
ment state at the time of the interview. Using the date of the interview I calculate
the time elapsed between interviews. With these two pieces of information I esti-
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mate the transition rates as continuous time Markov chains.23 This probabilistic
model arises when workers can find and lose jobs (i.e. change state) between two
employment status observations, and they find and lose jobs (change state) with
a frequency given by Poisson processes. The last property differentiates the con-
tinuous time Markov chain from a simple Markov chain. The assumptions from
the probabilistic model are the same as those implicit in the model, so the esti-
mates correspond exactly to the variables in the model. I use E and U to denote
employed and unemployed workers. The probabilities PEE(t) and PUE(t) of tran-
sitions EE and UE when the time between interviews is t, taking into account
that workers can find and lose jobs between employment status observations, are
PEE(t) =
f ∗
s+ f ∗
e−(f
∗+s)t +
s
s+ f ∗
, (2.23)
PUE(t) =
s
s+ f ∗
− s
s+ f ∗
e−(f
∗+s)t. (2.24)
I apply Maximum Likelihood Estimation to the above expressions. The estimation
gives the Poisson rates for the separation and job finding rates s and f ∗.
2.2.3 Comparing empirical and model’s Mm ratio
To estimate the empirical Mm ratio, I use the 50-10 percentile ratio of the residual
of log-wages in a Mincerian wage regression. Although the Mm ratio is the ratio
of the average and the minimum wage, using the 10th percentile reduces the mea-
surement error associated with the minimum observation. I consider the residual
of wage regression (2.22), with fixed effects. Given that the dependent variable is
log-wages, one must take the exponential of the residual before extracting the 50th
and 10th percentiles. The resulting 50-10 percentile ratio has a value of 1.34.24
I compare the empirical Mm ratio with the one in the model by using ex-
pression (2.21). The Mm ratio is uniquely determined by r, ρ, s, f ∗, µ and δ.
The earlier estimations give δ, f ∗, and s. Table 2.2 presents these values, where
23See Sheldon M. Ross (2007) for an exposition of this type of processes.
24Andreas Hornstein, Per Krusell and Giovanni L. Violante (2007a) follow a similar approach.
They find an Mm ratio of 1.33 for the PSID, after controlling for fixed effects.
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the flow rates correspond to monthly rates, and the value for δ to the effect of
one month of unemployment history on wages. The value for µ is consistent with
a working life of 40 years on average. I choose the interest rate r to be 5% on
average, which implies a monthly value for r of 0.0041. Finally, I consider the
same assumption as in Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2011), and use the value
in Shimer (2005) for ρ of 0.4.25 With these values, the model generates an Mm
ratio of 1.15.
Table 2.2: Estimates from PSID
Parameter Value Description
δ 0.0122 Depreciation rate of wage during unemployment
f ∗ 0.1591 Job finding probability
s 0.0035 Separation rate
To provide further evidence of the model’s contribution, I compare its Mm
ratio to the one corresponding to δ = 0. With δ = 0, the model corresponds
to the Pissarides (1985) model, which delivers an Mm ratio close to 1.04. The
baseline search model struggles to generate significant wage dispersion, precisely
the point made by Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2011).
While the mechanism of the paper accounts only for some of the wage disper-
sion observed in the data, comparing the above values for the Mm ratio shows
that the improvement brought by the model is important.
25Some papers use higher values for ρ. Hall and Milgrom (2008) choose ρ = 0.71 and Hagedorn
and Manovskii (2008) ρ ' 0.955. As I discussed in Chapter 1, Hornstein, Krusell and Violante
(2011) point out that with higher replacement ratios search models match the volatility of
unemployment, but generate less wage dispersion, making the frictional wage dispersion problem
worse. The highest value used by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) also implies that labor supply
becomes very responsive to unemployment benefits, as work by Costain and Reiter (2008) shows,
which is at odds with data. Hall and Milgrom (2008) make a similar point, with the value from
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) Frisch elasticities are too large. In Chapter 3 of the paper I
discuss higher replacement ratios in more detail.
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2.2.4 Correcting for selection bias
Attrition in panels may lead to selection bias problems. Individuals drop from
the sample, and the reason may not be random. What determines whether we
observe an individual may be correlated with wages. I use a version of James J.
Heckman (1979) two-steps procedure to correct for selection bias. It consists of
using some information that affects the probability of leaving the sample without
directly affecting wages. I use the number of children under 18 and marital status
as a determinant of whether the individual stays in the sample or not. Intuitively,
married workers with young children are less likely to move and leave the sample
than non-married workers without children. I exploit the hypothesis that these
variables affect the probability of sample selection, but are not directly correlated
with wages, to produce Heckman’s two-step correction term. More specifically, I
run the following probit regression
s∗i = Ziγ + vi, (2.25)
where s∗i is the latent variable, such that s
∗
i > 0 if the worker is present in the
sample. Regressors Zi contain the variables in X, plus number of children under
18, marital status and number of periods present in the sample. The number of
children and marital status are highly significant in the first stage. The Likelihood-
Ratio test is included in Table 2.1. The probit estimation produces the Heckman
correction term λˆ, that is then added as a covariate in (2.22). Column (5) in Table
2.1 displays the results. In column (5) X contains the covariates of regression
column (2), plus the correction term. The estimates of δ in columns (2) and (5)
are very close, so selection bias does not appear to affect the estimate for δ.
2.3 Labor market with constant benefits
In the previous sections I assumed that unemployed workers receive benefits pro-
portional to their human capital, i.e. they receive bh(γ). From this assumption,
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reservation productivities become independent of unemployment history, thus sim-
plifying the model and allowing for a closed form solution. To understand how
this assumption may affect the results, consider the following relationship between
benefits and workers’ reservation choice. If unemployment benefits are higher,
workers’ outside option increases in value. Workers respond to this by increasing
their reservation productivity. This relation between benefits and workers’ reser-
vation choice may suggest that by assuming decreasing benefits workers become
less picky, thus potentially driving the results. To address this concern, I develop
the model of the previous section, but now with constant unemployment benefits
b. I analyze how this new assumption affects the Mm ratio in the model.
2.3.1 Search behavior and labor market outcomes
Reservation productivities depend on unemployment history γ, so I can not sim-
plify the notation p∗γ. Equations (2.1) to (2.13) remain the same, except that bh(γ)
should be replaced by b. I reproduce here expression (2.13) for wages, which is
the result of combining the asset equation of an employed worker (2.2), the asset
equation of a filled vacancy (2.4), and the surplus sharing rule (2.6):
w(γ, p) = h(γ)(βp+ (1− β)p∗γ). (2.26)
The next proposition characterizes workers’ search behavior, and provides some
important results about reservation productivities p∗γ. The following results are
independent of any distributional assumption for F (p).
Proposition 2. a. There exists γ¯ such that p∗γ¯ = p
max, and the reservation wage
of workers with γ = γ¯ is given by w(γ¯, p∗γ¯) = b. Furthermore, γ¯ = −log(b/pmax)/δ.
b. The reservation productivity p∗γ is increasing in γ.
c. The reservation wage w(γ, p∗γ) is decreasing in γ.
Corollary. The job finding probability f(1− F (p∗γ)) is decreasing in γ.
The proofs are included in appendix 2.5, but I provide some intuition here.
When bargaining over wages, both workers and firms receive their outside option
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plus a share of the surplus of the match. The worker’s outside option U(γ) includes
the constant benefits b, so the worker must always get payments b at the very
least. While benefits are constant, the potential output h(γ)p decreases with
unemployment history. Eventually, if the worker stays unemployed for too long,
no matches yield p high enough to cover b. At that point no matches are profitable,
and the worker drops from the labor force. The proposition shows in result (a) that
if unemployment history goes beyond γ¯, workers leave the labor force.26 A similar
mechanism explains result (b) that p∗γ is increasing in γ. Benefits b are constant,
but output h(γ)p and the surplus of the match decrease with higher unemployment
history γ. The higher γ gets, the better matches are required for the match to
be profitable. In the model of previous sections, assuming decreasing benefits
bh(γ) pushed down the reservation productivities by lowering the worker’s outside
option U(γ).27 Finally, the result of the corollary, that the job finding probability
is decreasing with γ, follows from the increasing reservation productivity.
2.3.2 Reservation productivities
Because the reservation productivity p∗γ depends on γ if benefits are constant, a
closed form expression is not straightforward. Further, one needs to assume a
distribution for match-specific productivities F (p) to be able to solve the model.
To simplify the calculations I assume that F (p) follows a uniform with support
[0, pmax].28 Given this distributional assumption, I use numerical methods to solve
the model. Consider (2.1), with constant b instead of bh(γ), as a differential
26Coles and Masters (2000) also find that if benefits are constant, and skills depreciate during
unemployment, workers leave the labor force if they stay unemployed too long, becoming long-
term unemployed.
27The additional assumption that benefits are proportional to h(γ) gives the constant reser-
vation productivity in section 2.1.
28The parameter pmax plays no role in the results, because independently of its value p∗γ and
pmax keep the same ratio. Its value would matter if one introduces endogenous and exogenous
separations, and is interested in matching their empirical values, as in Pissarides (2009).
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equation. Integrating it gives the following expression for U(γ)
U(γ) =
b
r + µ
+ f
∫ γ¯
γ
e−(r+µ)(Γ−γ)
(∫ pmax
p∗Γ
(W (Γ, p)− U(Γ))dF (p)
)
dΓ.
(2.27)
I derive an equation similar to (2.19). Substituting wage expression (2.26) into
the asset equation for J(γ, p) gives
(r + µ+ s)J(γ, p) = (1− β)h(γ)(p− p∗γ). (2.28)
Given the above equation and the Nash Bargaining sharing rule (2.6), the expres-
sion for U(γ) as given in (2.27) becomes:
p∗γh(γ) = b+
∫ γ¯
γ
e−(r+µ)(Γ−γ)
(
α
∫ pmax
p∗Γ
h(Γ)(p− p∗Γ)dF (p)
)
dΓ, (2.29)
where α = βf(r+µ)/(r+µ+ s). Equation (2.29) provides a way of solving for p∗γ
numerically. Using numerical integration and iteration methods I find p∗γ for a grid
{γ1 = 0, γ2, ..., γn = γ¯} of the possible unemployment histories [0, γ¯]. Appendix
2.5 presents the details of the computational strategy.
2.3.3 Endogenous distributions GU(γ) and GE(γ)
With constant benefits, deriving the Mm ratio requires knowledge of the endoge-
nous distributions of unemployment histories. I use GU(γ) and GE(γ) to denote
their cumulative density functions for unemployed and employed workers, and N
and E for the number of unemployed and employed workers.
To find the endogenous distribution of γ, I look at the flows in the labor market.
Unemployed workers find jobs at a rate f(1−F (p∗γ)), employed workers lose their
jobs at rate s, and all workers leave the labor force at rate µ. Workers leaving the
labor force are replaced by new entrants with zero unemployment history.
First, consider the group of unemployed workers with unemployment history
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lower than γ. In steady-state, a stationary distribution requires that the flows in
and out of this group be equal. For γ ≤ γ¯, this condition gives the following flow
equation
gU(γ)N + f
(∫ γ
0
(1− F (p∗γ))dGU(γ)
)
N + µGU(γ)N = (2.30)
= sGE(γ)E + µ(E +N).
The left-hand side corresponds to flows out of the group of unemployed workers
with unemployment history lower than γ. The first term represents the workers in
that group who have exactly γ unemployment history; the second term those who
find a job; and the third term those who leave the labor force. The right-hand
side of (2.30) captures the flows in. The first term are the employed workers with
unemployment history lower than γ who lose their jobs, and the last term are the
new entrants (they have zero unemployment history).
Similarly, consider now the group of employed workers with unemployment
history lower than γ. In steady-state, for γ ≤ γ¯, the following flow equation holds
(s+ µ)GE(γ)E = f
(∫ γ
0
(1− F (p∗γ))dGU(γ)
)
N. (2.31)
The intuition is similar. The left-hand side of (2.31) captures the flows out of
the group of employed workers with unemployment history lower than γ, and the
right-hand side are the flows in.
When γ > γ¯, only workers with unemployment history lower than γ¯ find jobs.29
Similar equations to (2.30) and (2.31) hold for γ > γ¯
gU(γ)N + f
(∫ γ¯
0
(1− F (p∗γ))dGU(γ)
)
N + µGU(γ)N = (2.32)
= sGE(γ¯)E + µ(E +N),
29The results would be the same if workers are replaced after γ¯ by new workers with zero
unemployment history.
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and
(s+ µ)GE(γ¯)E = f
(∫ γ¯
0
(1− F (p∗γ))dGU(γ)
)
N. (2.33)
To simplify the exposition, I define Φ(γ) as
Φ(γ) = µ
(
f(1− F (p∗γ)) + s+ µ
s+ µ
)
. (2.34)
The flow equations shown above give a solution for the density gU(γ). For γ ≤ γ¯
gU(γ) = gU(γ¯) exp
(∫ γ¯
γ
Φ(y)dy
)
, (2.35)
and for γ > γ¯
gU(γ) = gU(γ¯) eµ(γ¯−γ). (2.36)
The derivations are included in appendix 2.5. To find the final expression for the
densities, I derive gU(γ¯) by using the following identities:
GU(γ¯) = gU(γ¯)
∫ γ¯
0
exp
(∫ γ¯
Γ
Φ(y)dy
)
dΓ (2.37)
1−GU(γ¯) = 1
µ
gU(γ¯). (2.38)
The above equations result from integrating (2.35) between 0 and γ¯, and (2.36)
between γ¯ and infinity.
Given that gU(γ) is known now, I derive GE(γ) by using (2.31) and (2.33):
GE(γ) =
∫ γ
0
(1− F (p∗Γ))dGU(Γ)∫ γ¯
0
(1− F (p∗Γ))dGU(Γ)
. (2.39)
The density gE(γ) follows by taking derivative:
gE(γ) =
(1− F (p∗γ))∫ γ¯
0
(1− F (p∗Γ))dG(Γ)
gU(γ). (2.40)
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2.3.4 Calibration
Before evaluating wage dispersion in the model I need to calibrate b and f . I
choose two targets. In line with the choice for the replacement ratio ρ in the
previous sections, the first target imposes that ρ be around 0.4, so benefits b must
be around 40% of average wages w¯. Average wages are given by
w¯ =
∫ γ¯
0
(∫ pmax
p∗Γ
w(Γ, p)
dF (p)
1− F (p∗γ)
)
dGE(Γ). (2.41)
Given this expression for average wages, the target requires b/w¯ = 0.4.
The second target imposes that the job finding probability in the model must
match its empirical counterpart. Thus, I choose the value for f for which the
average job finding rate f e = f
∫ γ¯
0
(1−F (p∗Γ))dGU(γ) equals the empirical estimate
from the PSID, i.e. such that f e = 0.159. These two targets, and the rest of
equations in the model, give unique values for b and f .
2.3.5 The Mm ratio with constant benefits
Figure 2.1 depicts the reservation productivities p∗γ as a function of unemployment
history γ over its support [0, γ¯]. As proven in proposition 2, the reservation pro-
ductivity is increasing in γ, and when γ = γ¯ it reaches the maximum value pmax.
Figure 2.2 shows the probability density function gE(γ) as a function of γ, also
over its support [0, γ¯].
Similar to the model with proportional benefits, wages are proportional to the
human capital level h(γ), with w(γ, p) = h(γ)(βp + (1 − β)p∗γ). The focus of the
paper is on residual wage dispersion, and given that one can remove h(γ) in wage
regressions, I focus on the wage dispersion generated by βp + (1 − β)p∗γ. Using
that the lowest reservation productivity corresponds to γ = 0, the Mm ratio is
given by
Mm =
∫ γ¯
0
(∫ pmax
p∗Γ
(βp+ (1− β)p∗Γ)
dF (p)
1− F (p∗Γ)
)
dGE(Γ)/p∗0. (2.42)
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Figure 2.1: Reservation productivities p∗γ with constant benefits
Figure 2.2: Distribution of unemployment history γ
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For the model with constant benefits, the Mm ratio has a value of around 1.16.
Table 2.3 summarizes the several results found for the Mm ratio.
Table 2.3: The Mm ratio with PSID flows
Empirical 1.3367
Baseline model 1.0357
f ∗ − 1std 1.0380 s− 1std 1.0349
f ∗ + 1std 1.0336 s+ 1std 1.0364
Proportional benefits bh(γ) 1.1529
f ∗ − 1std 1.1628 s− 1std 1.1497
f ∗ + 1std 1.1441 s+ 1std 1.1560
Constant benefits b 1.1600
f ∗ − 1std 1.1686 s− 1std 1.1567
f ∗ + 1std 1.1522 s+ 1std 1.1632
Notes.- Table 2.3 shows the Mm ratio when the job finding and separation rates are taken from
PSID estimates. Baseline model refers to the model with δ equal 0. The bh(γ) and b models
correspond to the models with proportional and constant benefits. The cell f∗ − 1std gives the
Mm ratio evaluated at the value of f∗ minus one standard deviation of the estimate for f∗ in
the PSID.
Although unemployment punishes workers less when benefits are constant, the
Mm ratio is higher than that of the model with proportional benefits. To under-
stand why, consider workers with unemployment history below and above average.
Workers with below average unemployment history are less picky, and have lower
reservation productivity, whereas the opposite is true for workers with above av-
erage unemployment history. Given that the model tries to match a replacement
ratio of 40%, to match this target workers with below average unemployment
history become less picky than workers in the model with proportional benefits.
Because the Mm ratio relies on the lowest reservation productivity, this mech-
anism increases the Mm ratio. However, the resulting increase is mild, because
workers with below average unemployment history behave in a very similar way
than workers in the model with proportional benefits. Given that the distribution
of workers is very concentrated on workers with low unemployment history, who
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have very similar reservation productivities compared to the proportional benefits
model, this barely affects the average productivity. In particular, if b is chosen to
match the replacement ratio in the model with proportional benefits, the same b
almost matches the replacement ratio when benefits are constant, because a large
mass of workers (those with low unemployment history) have almost the same
reservation productivity.
2.4 Extending the exercise to the economy at
large
Up to this point, the quantitative assessment of wage dispersion has been very
specific to the PSID. While the PSID was constructed to be representative of the
US economy, one wonders how the results extend to other larger data sets, such
as the CPS. This question gains interest if one compares the labor market flows
in both data sets. The estimates for the job finding and separation rates from the
PSID and the CPS show that the PSID is a more stable sample of workers than
the CPS. Both the job finding and separation rates are smaller in the PSID, but
relative to the separation rate the job finding rate is higher in the PSID. In light of
these observations, I explore the amount of wage dispersion consistent with CPS
labor market flows.
I focus on the CPS because its size and characteristics make it very represen-
tative of the US labor market. Among other things, it provides the estimates for
the unemployment rate in the US, and the estimates in Shimer (2005) for the job
finding and job separation rates, which are the standard reference in the litera-
ture. Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2011) use the values in Shimer (2005) to
assess wage dispersion in search models, so choosing the CPS allows for further
comparison between their results and those of this paper.
Similar to Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2011), I assign a value of 0.43 to
the job finding rate, and a value of 0.03 to the separation rate. I use the value
for δ from the PSID, and the value for µ that is consistent with a working life of
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40 years. The Mm ratio increases to around 1.21-1.22, both with constant and
proportional benefits. Intuitively, if µ and δ are constant, what matters for wage
dispersion is the relative size of f ∗ and s.30 As discussed earlier, while both f ∗ and
s are higher in the CPS, the ratio f ∗/s is higher in the PSID.31 Thus the increase
in the Mm ratio.
Table 2.4: The Mm ratio with CPS labor flows
Source Mm ratio
Empirical 1.70 - 1.90
Baseline model 1.05
Proportional benefits bh(γ) 1.2095
Constant benefits b 1.2185
Notes.- Table 2.4 shows the Mm ratio when the job finding and separation rates are taken
from Robert Shimer (2005). Baseline model refers to the model with δ equal 0. The bh(γ)
and b models correspond to the models with proportional and constant benefits.
Table 2.4 summarizes the results. With CPS labor flows, the Mm ratio is
around 1.05 for the baseline random matching model, which corresponds to the
model with δ = 0. Using the same labor market flows, I find that the model
with loss of human capital during unemployment gives an Mm ratio of up to
1.22. Empirically, the 50-10 percentile ratio in the CPS is between 1.7 and 1.9.
Some wage dispersion remains unexplained, but the model explains between 24%
and 31% of the observed residual wage dispersion in the CPS. This an important
improvement over the baseline model, as the baseline model can only explain 6%
of observed wage dispersion.
30Or the average job finding rate fe in the case of constant benefits.
31That a labor outcome depends on the ratio of f∗ and s is not surprising, for example in
search models the unemployment rate also depends on the ratio rather than the separate values.
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2.5 Mathematical Appendix
2.5.1 Proof of proposition 1
The proof proceeds by guessing a solution and then confirming the guess. Guessing
that U(γ) = h(γ)U , with U independent of γ. Given the guess, I use now that
(r + µ)U(γ) = h(γ)p∗γ to get
p∗γ = (r + µ)U, (2.43)
which is independent of γ. In the text I use p∗ to denote the reservation pro-
ductivity. Substituting these results in (2.1), the asset equation for U(γ), gives a
unique solution for U . Given that the Bellman equation has a unique solution (it
is a contraction), this proves the result.
2.5.2 Derivation of the Mm ratio
The text shows that taking expectations of (2.14) gives that w¯ = ¯h(γ)(βp¯ + (1−
β)p∗), where p¯ is defined by p¯ = E(p|p ≥ p∗) = ∫ pmax
p∗ p
dF (p)
1−F (p∗) . Further, because
ρ = b ¯h(γ)/w¯, we also have that b = ρ(βp¯+ (1− β)p∗). The Mm ratio is given by
(2.21), which I reproduce here
Mm = (βp¯+ (1− β)p∗)/p∗. (2.44)
Denote the job finding rate f(1 − F (p∗)) by f ∗. Using (2.20) one can derive the
Mm ratio in the following way
r + µ+ δ
r + µ
p∗ = b+ βf ∗
∫ pmax
p∗
p− p∗
r + µ+ s
dF (p)
1− F (p∗) , (2.45)(
r + µ+ δ
r + µ
+
f ∗
r + µ+ s
)
p∗ =
(
ρ+
f ∗
r + µ+ s
)
(βp¯+ (1− β)p∗) (2.46)
where the second equation is obtained using that β(p−p∗) = (βp+(1−β)p∗)−p∗.
The expression for Mm in the text results from rearranging the last equation.
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2.5.3 Proof of proposition 2
Proof of a. The proof proceeds by contradiction. Function h(γ) is decreasing
in γ and tends to zero as γ tends to infinity (remember, h(γ) = e−δγ). Therefore,
there exists a γ¯ such that h(γ¯)pmax = b, and h(γ)pmax < b for all γ > γ¯. Suppose
now that part (a) of the proposition is not true, and p∗γ¯ < p
max. Then
p∗γ¯h(γ¯) < h(γ¯)p
max = b. (2.47)
From (2.11) we know that p∗γ¯h(γ¯) = w(γ, p
∗
γ¯). It is clear from the Nash bargaining
sharing rule that the worker is always compensated for his outside option U(γ),
so workers must get at the very least the stream of payments b (one can see this
more formally by solving (2.1) as a differential equation). As a result w(γ, p∗γ) ≥ b
for all γ, so combining this with the above gives
b ≤ p∗γ¯h(γ¯) < h(γ¯)pmax = b, (2.48)
which is a contradiction. Taking γ¯ as defined earlier proves the first part of part
(a). By definition of γ¯, h(γ¯)pmax = b. Combining this with p∗γ¯h(γ¯) = w(γ, p
∗
γ¯) and
p∗γ¯ = p
max gives the second result in a. Finally, taking logarithm of h(γ¯)pmax = b
and rearranging gives the expression for γ¯.
Proof of b. The proof requires a few steps. First, define the total surplus of a
match as S(γ, p) = J(γ, p) + W (γ, p) − U(γ), for p ≥ p∗γ. The Nash Bargaining
sharing rule implies that workers and firms get their outside option plus their share
of the total surplus (β for the worker, 1− β for the firm). As potential output is
decreasing in γ, it is clear that the surplus is decreasing in γ. To prove this more
formally, using the asset equations one finds that S(γ, p) = h(γ)p− (r + µ)U(γ).
When p = p∗γ the surplus equals zero for all γ, so dS(γ, p)/dγ = 0 for all γ. Taking
derivative of S(γ, p) with respect to γ one sees that it is decreasing in p. This
implies that dS(γ, p)/dγ < 0 if p > p∗γ. Note that all these expressions are well-
defined. Given that J(γ, p) = (1 − β)S(γ, p), then J(γ, p) is also decreasing in γ
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if p > p∗γ.
Now assume that there exist γ0 and γ1 such that γ0 < γ1 and p
∗
γ0
> p∗γ1 . This
assumption implies that J(γ1, p
∗
γ0
) > 0, as J(γ, p) > 0 for all p > p∗γ. But J is
decreasing in γ, and given the assumption p∗γ0 > p
∗
γ1
, J(γ1, p
∗
γ0
) is well defined and
J(γ1, p
∗
γ0
) < J(γ0, p
∗
γ0
) = 0. This is a contradiction, thus p∗γ is non-decreasing in
γ. That p∗γ is not constant can be readily seen from the expression for U(γ).
Proof of c. I prove first that if some function pi(γ) is non-increasing, i.e.
pi′(γ) ≤ 0 for all γ, then the function Π(γ) = ∫ γ¯
γ
e−r(Γ−γ)pi(Γ)dΓ is decreasing
in γ. Intuitively, Π(γ) is the present value of the stream of payments pi between
γ and the final period γ¯. If these payments are decreasing Π(γ) is unambiguously
decreasing. I apply the result to the following expression for U(γ), that is derived
by integrating (2.1), with constant b instead of bh(γ):
U(γ) =
b
r + µ
+ f
∫ γ¯
γ
e−(r+µ)(Γ−γ)
(∫ pmax
p∗Γ
(W (Γ, p)− U(Γ))dF (p)
)
dΓ.
(2.49)
This proves that U(γ) is decreasing. Since (r + µ)U(γ) = w(γ, p∗γ), this proves
part (c) of the proposition.
To prove that Π(γ) is decreasing, first observe that Π(γ¯) = 0, and Π(γ) > 0 if
γ < γ¯. This implies that Π(γ) must be decreasing near γ¯. Therefore, if it is not
true that Π′(γ) < 0 for all γ, there must exists γ0 such that Π′(γ0) = 0. I show
that this leads to a contradiction.
Take derivative of Π(γ):
Π′(γ) = −pi(γ) + r
∫ γ¯
γ
e−r(Γ−γ)pi(Γ)dΓ. (2.50)
That Π′(γ0) = 0 implies that
pi(γ0) = r
∫ γ¯
γ0
e−r(Γ−γ0)pi(Γ)dΓ, (2.51)
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which further implies that
Π(γ0) =
pi(γ0)
r
. (2.52)
That pi(γ) is decreasing implies that pi(γ0) ≥ pi(γ) for all γ ≥ γ0. Therefore
Π(γ0) ≥
∫ γ¯
γ0
e−r(Γ−γ0)pi(γ0)dΓ =
pi(γ0)
r
(
1− e−r(γ¯−γ0)) . (2.53)
The expression above implies that Π(γ0) <
pi(γ0)
r
, leading to a contradiction.
2.5.4 Endogenous distributions GU(γ) and GE(γ) with con-
stant benefits b
Equation (2.31) implies
GE(γ)E =
f
s+ µ
(∫ γ
0
1− F (p∗γ)dGU(γ)
)
N. (2.54)
Similarly, using (2.33) and that GE(γ¯) = 1 as no worker is hired if γ > γ¯
E =
f
s+ µ
(∫ γ¯
0
1− F (p∗γ)dGU(γ)
)
N. (2.55)
Now take the derivative of (2.30) with respect to γ to find
gU(γ)N + f(1− F (p∗γ)gU(γ)N + µgU(γ)N = sgE(γ)E. (2.56)
Taking now derivative of (2.31)
gE(γ)E =
f
s+ µ
(1− F (p∗γ))gU(γ)N. (2.57)
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Combining the two equations above gives
dgU(γ)
dγ
N + (f(1− F (p∗)) + µ) gU(γ)N = s
s+ µ
f(1− F (p∗))gU(γ)N,
(2.58)
which implies the following differential equation
dgU(γ)
dγ
+ Φ(γ)gU(γ) = 0, (2.59)
where Φ(γ) is defined in the text as Φ(γ) = µ
(
f(1−F (p∗γ))+s+µ
s+µ
)
. The solution gives
the expression in the text:
gU(γ) = gU(γ¯)exp
(∫ γ¯
γ
Φ(y)dy
)
. (2.60)
To find gU(γ) for γ > γ¯ I proceed similarly. Taking derivative of (2.32)
dgU(γ)
dγ
N + µgU(γ)N = 0. (2.61)
This implies the result of the text:
gU(γ) = exp (µ(γ¯ − γ)) g(γ¯). (2.62)
2.5.5 Numerical strategy to find p∗γ
Consider equation (2.29). Using the assumption of F (p) being uniform [0, pmax]
gives
p∗γ = (h(γ))
−1
(
b+ βf
r + µ
r + µ+ s
∫ γ¯
γ
e−(r+µ)(Γ−γ)h(Γ)
(pmax − p∗Γ)2
2pmax
dΓ
)
.
(2.63)
I use the following strategy to solve for p∗γ. Consider a grid {γ1 = 0, γ2, ..., γn = γ¯}
of the range of unemployment histories [0, γ¯]. Given an initial guess for the vector
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of unemployment histories {p∗γi}i, I calculate the integral in the above equation
using numerical integration. Entering the result in the above equation gives the
new value for p∗γ. Iterating until convergence provides the solution for p
∗
γ.
See Kenneth Judd (1998) for a bound on the size of the error involved in the
numerical integration. This error decreases as the grid uses more nodes. How-
ever, as the strategy combines numerical integration and iteration methods, the
final bound on the error is not straightforward. To assess the error involved in
this numerical strategy, I test how well it approximates a known solution. This
provides, in the language of Judd (1998), some backward error analysis. Consider
the general case of the equation above
f(γ) = a1(γ) + a2(γ)
∫ γ¯
γ
φ(Γ, f(Γ))dΓ. (2.64)
The method described earlier provides a solution for this general case. For the
case where the ai are constant and φ(Γ, f(Γ)) = f(Γ) an exact solution exists.
Comparing the exact solution to the one provided by the numerical strategy shows
that the numerical solution can get as close as necessary to the exact solution
within a reasonable time.
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2.6 Data Appendix: PSID
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) started collecting data in 1968.
The original PSID consisted of two samples: the core sample, representative of
the US population; and the SEO sample, an oversample of low income families. In
1968 the PSID initially followed 5000 families, 3000 of them from the core sample,
and the rest from the SEO sample. Since then the PSID has grown in size, as it
followed young family members when they formed their own family.
The PSID collected data annually between 1968 and 1997, but biennially after
1997 for funding reasons. Therefore, after 1997 information on the number of
weeks in unemployment is unavailable for the years without interviews.32 As
the empirical work requires knowledge of workers’ unemployment history, I only
include the 1968-1997 PSID waves, and discard waves after 1997.
Information in the PSID is mostly retrospective. For example, questions about
hours worked or income earned refer to the previous calendar year. For example,
the year t wave asks about the income earned during year t− 1. As is standard in
the literature, I construct wages by dividing total labor earnings by the number
of hours worked.
I now describe the sample choice, which is standard in the literature. I restrict
my attention to male workers between 18 and 65 years old in the core sample. I
include only observations with positive earnings. Similar to Andreas Hornstein,
Per Krusell and Giovanni L. Violante (2011), I exclude observations with too many
hours or too few work hours, more specifically, if work hours are lower than 520
or greater than 5096. Excluding these outliers reduces measurement error. I also
ignore observations for which the real wage is lower than half the minimum wage
of 1982, or with top-coded earnings. I exclude workers in farming or in the army.
For the fixed effects estimation only workers with a minimum of 8 observations
are included. Finally, I exclude individuals currently self-employed, in school,
32For example, if the worker is interviewed in 1997 and again in 1999, information on number
of weeks unemployed in 1998 is unavailable.
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inactive, or living in Alaska or Hawaii. I drop individuals with inconsistent or
missing information.33
This selection leaves 2,160 workers, with observations spanning the 30 years
between 1968-1997. In total the sample includes 34,542 observations, or 1,151
worker/year observations.
33Although very few workers are affected by this once I implement the previous selection
criteria.
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Chapter 3
Unemployment History with
On-the-Job Search
Search models struggle to generate significant wage dispersion. As previous chap-
ters discuss, Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2011) show that in baseline search
models the average observed wage is only 5% above the minimum observed wage,
whereas empirically it is between 70% and 90%. Or more formally, the Mm ra-
tio is 1.05 in baseline search models, whereas its empirical counterpart, the 50-10
percentile ratio of the residual in a Mincerian wage regression, is between 1.7 and
1.9 .
In the previous chapter I show that if workers lose some human capital or
skills during unemployment, wage dispersion increases significantly among iden-
tical workers. Because workers are aware that unemployment hurts their wages,
they accept lower wages to give themselves a better chance to leave unemployment
and avoid big human capital losses. With a lower reservation wage, wage disper-
sion increases. I show that wage dispersion is uniquely determined by a set of
parameters, namely labor market flows, the interest rate, the value of non-market
time and the rate at which workers lose human capital during unemployment.
Using evidence from micro data to simulate the model I show that adding un-
employment history is an important improvement over baseline search models.
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The mechanism accounts for between 28% and 45% of the observed residual wage
dispersion. In particular, with CPS labor market flows the Mm ratio is around
1.22.
Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2011) show that allowing for on-the-job search
improves the performance of search models. Intuitively, the problem with search
models is that they predict that workers wait a long time before accepting a job
offer. If workers are allowed to search while being employed, they are willing
to accept lower paying offers because they do not give up the option to search
when they accept a job. Wage dispersion in a search model with on-the-job search
is similar to that in the model with unemployment history, with an Mm ratio
between 1.16 and 1.27.
This paper adds on-the-job search to the framework with loss of human capital
during unemployment. The Mm ratio is again uniquely determined by a set of
parameters for which reliable estimates exist. Compared to the model with un-
employment history, wage dispersion further depends on how frequently job offers
arrive on the job. As with the baseline model and its extension with unemployment
history, wage dispersion does not rely on any assumption about the distribution of
match qualities. I show that adding on-the-job search significantly increases wage
dispersion among identical workers. The model with unemployment history and
on-the-job search delivers an Mm ratio of around 2, thus accounting for all of the
observed residual wage dispersion in the CPS.
The model also addresses the trade-off found by Hornstein, Krusell and Vi-
olante (2011) between explaining frictional wage dispersion and cyclical fluctua-
tions in unemployment and vacancies. Matching the cyclical behavior of unem-
ployment and vacancies requires high values of non-market time, as measured by
the replacement ratio —benefits over average wages. However, a high replacement
ratio makes the frictional wage dispersion problem significantly worse. I show that
even with the highest value in the literature for the replacement ratio, the model
with unemployment history and on-the-job search yields a high Mm ratio of 1.68,
thus accounting for almost all of the observed residual wage dispersion.
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First I derive wage dispersion in the model with on-the-job search. Next, I
find the Mm ratio for the model with both unemployment history and on-the-
job search and quantify the resulting wage dispersion. I then explore how wage
dispersion depends on the value of non-market time, and show that wage dispersion
is large even for high values of the replacement ratio.
3.1 Frictional Wage Dispersion with On-the-Job
Search
In baseline search models, workers hold their jobs until separation occurs, so work-
ers must go through unemployment to change jobs. However, if workers can search
for jobs when they are employed, they keep the option of searching when they ac-
cept a job offer. For example, in the extreme case in which job offers arrive at
the same rate to unemployed and employed workers, unemployed workers would
take any offer that pays more than unemployment benefits —or non-market time.
So with on-the-job search unemployed workers accept lower wages and wage dis-
persion increases. The size of the increase depends on how frequently employed
workers receive job offers relative to unemployed workers.
Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2011) extend a version of Burdett’s job ladder
model to quantify wage dispersion with on-the-job search. Assume that workers
draw wage offers from a distribution F (w). Unemployed workers receive job offers
at rate fu, and employed workers at rate f e. Jobs are destroyed at an exoge-
nous rate s, and during unemployment workers receive unemployment benefits b.
Workers set a reservation wage w∗ and accept any job above this wage. The asset
equations for unemployment and employment U and W (w) are
rU = b+ fu
∫ wmax
w∗
(W (y)− U)dF (y), (3.1)
rW (w) = w + f e
∫ wmax
w
(W (y)−W (w))dF (y)− s(W (w)− U). (3.2)
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The above equations capture that at rate f e an employed worker takes a new draw
from F (w), and if the new wage is above the current wage the worker switches
to the new job. To simplify the calculations, assume that no firm makes an offer
below w∗, so F (w∗) = 0.1 However, it is worth noting that with this assumption
fu is now also the job finding rate.
As workers move jobs, the distribution of wages becomes endogenous. Denoting
this endogenous distribution by G(w), one can derive this distribution by looking
at labor flow equations. Consider the group of workers with wages below w. In
steady state the flows out of this group must equal the flows in. Therefore, the
following equation holds
fuF (w)N = (s+ f e(1− F (w)))G(w)E, (3.3)
where N and E are the number of unemployed and employed workers. The left-
hand side captures the flows in. They are given by the unemployed workers who
find a job that pays a wage lower than w. The flows out are on the right-hand
side, which are due to workers either losing their job or finding a job that pays a
wage above w. Since in steady-state the flows in and out of unemployment must
also be equal, we also have that E/N = fu/s. Therefore, G(w) as a function of
F (w) is given by
G(w) =
s
s+ f e(1− F (w))F (w). (3.4)
The Mm ratio is given by Mm = w¯/w∗, where the average observed wage is
now given by
w¯ =
∫ wmax
w∗
wdG(w). (3.5)
Using the asset equation for the unemployed (3.1) and the expression for the
1The results are the same without this assumption, but the derivation is simpler.
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distribution of G(w) in (3.4) gives the expression for the Mm ratio
Mm ' 1 +
fu−fe
r+s+fe
ρ+ f
u−fe
r+s+fe
. (3.6)
The details of the derivation are in the appendix. The Mm ratio shows what the
intuition suggested, that the amount of wage dispersion depends on the relative
size of fu and fw. The more frequently job offers arrive to employed workers
relative to unemployed workers, the more attractive employment is to workers.
Therefore, the reservation wage decreases with the arrival rate of offers on-the-
job, and wage dispersion increases. For example, if job offers arrive with the same
frequency to unemployed and employed workers, workers accept any wage offer
above the benefits b.
3.2 Combining Unemployment History and On-
the-Job Search
In this section I extend the model with unemployment history and add on-the-
job search. I derive a closed form solution for the Mm ratio, and use empirical
evidence to quantify its magnitude.
3.2.1 The labor market
I assume that workers search on-the-job in the model with unemployment history
and proportional benefits bh(γ) of section 2.1. Given that I prove in Chapter 2
that the models with proportional and constant benefits behave in almost the same
way, this restriction is without a loss of generality. The assumptions are the same,
only that now unemployed workers receive job offers at rate fu, and employed
workers receive job offers at rate fw. The asset equations for unemployed workers
(2.1) and vacancies (2.3) remain the same. So for unemployed workers the asset
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equation is
(r + µ)U(γ) = bh(γ) + fu
∫ pmax
p∗γ
(W (γ, y)− U(γ))dF (y) + ∂U(γ)
∂γ
. (3.7)
However, the equation for employed workers is now given by
(r + µ)W (γ, p) = w(γ, p) + fw
∫ pmax
p
(W (γ, y)−W (γ, p))dF (y) (3.8)
− s(W (γ, p)− U(γ)).
Compared to (2.2), equation (3.8) captures that workers now also receive job offers
at a rate fw. If the productivity is above the current level p they change jobs.
Similarly, the asset equation for a filled vacancy is now given by
(r + µ)J(γ, p) = h(γ)p− w(γ, p)− (s+ fw(1− F (p)))(J(γ, p)− V ). (3.9)
Intuitively, firms get a net flow h(γ)p−w(γ, p). The job is destroyed either because
of separation, which happens with frequency s, or because the worker finds a better
job, which happens with frequency fw(1− F (p)).
As in section 2.1, assuming that benefits are proportional implies that reser-
vation productivities are independent of unemployment history γ, so p∗γ = p
∗.
Proposition 3. The reservation productivity p∗γ is independent of γ, i.e. p
∗
γ = p
∗.
This simplifies the model and allows for a closed form expression of wage dis-
persion. The proof proceeds in the same way as in the proof of proposition 1.2 The
intuition is also similar. All payments, both during employment and unemploy-
ment, are proportional to the human capital level h(γ). As a result, unemployment
history γ is irrelevant for workers’ choice of reservation productivity.
2In their version of the Burdett-Mortensen model with human capital accumulation, Burdett,
Carrillo-Tudela and Coles (2011) also find that the reservation piece rate is independent of
experience.
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3.2.2 The Mm ratio
Using the asset equations one gets that wages are of the form w(γ, p) = h(γ)wˆ(p),
where wˆ(p) is independent of γ. This shows that, as in the model with human
capital losses during unemployment, log wages are linear in unemployment history
with coefficient δ. Given the focus of the paper on wage dispersion among identical
workers, I control for unemployment history in the empirical exercise and focus
on the wage dispersion of wˆ(p).
For a given F (p), workers move jobs once they become employed. I denote
G(p) the endogenous distribution of match productivities. The average of wˆ(p),
which I denote ¯ˆw = E(wˆ(p)|p > p∗), is thus given by
¯ˆw =
∫ pmax
p∗
wˆ(y)dG(y). (3.10)
Equation (2.11) gives that w(γ, p∗) = h(γ)p∗, so the Mm ratio is given by
Mm = ¯ˆw/p∗. (3.11)
Using the asset equation for unemployed workers (2.1) and the asset equation for
employed workers (3.8) evaluated at p = p∗ gives the following equation
h(γ)p∗ + fw
∫ pmax
p∗
(W (γ, y)− U(γ))dF (y) =
=
r + µ
r + µ+ δ
(
bh(γ) + fu
∫ pmax
p∗
(W (γ, y)− U(γ))dF (y)
)
. (3.12)
Given the paper’s focus on the steady state, without loss of generality I assume
that F (p∗) = 0 for the derivation of the Mm ratio. Therefore fu is the job finding
rate. This assumption makes the exposition simpler, but the results are exactly
the same without it. Combining (3.12) equation with the other equations in the
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model gives the following expression for the Mm ratio
Mm =
1 +
( r+µ
r+µ+δ
)fu−fw
r+µ+s+fw
( r+µ
r+µ+δ
)ρ+
( r+µ
r+µ+δ
)fu−fw
r+µ+s+fw
, (3.13)
where fu is the job finding probability and fw is the rate at which job offers arrive
on the job. Appendix 2.5 includes the details of the derivation.
By shutting down the appropriate channel, expression (3.13) also provides the
Mm ratio for the baseline search model, the model with unemployment history,
and the on-the-job search model. If δ = 0, the unemployment history mechanism
is shut down and (3.13) gives the expression for the Mm ratio in the on-the-
job search model (3.6). If fw = 0, on-the-job search is shut down and (3.13)
corresponds to (2.21). Finally, setting both δ = 0 and fw = 0 gives the Mm ratio
for the baseline search model (1.2).
3.2.3 Quantifying the Model’s Mm Ratio
Wage dispersion, as measured by the Mm ratio in (3.13), depends uniquely on
a few parameters, r, ρ, s, µ, fu, fw and δ. Further, it is independent of any
distributional assumption about F (p). The relationship between these parameters
and wage dispersion is the same as before, only that now it further depends on
the arrival rate of offers on the job fw. Larger values of fw imply that it is easier
to switch jobs, making the option value of searching on the job larger. Workers
thus accept lower wages and wage dispersion increases.
I use the CPS values for the job finding and separation rates fu and s as
in Chapter 2. To quantify wage dispersion in the model, the expression for the
Mm ratio requires a value for the arrival rate fw. Similar to Hornstein, Krusell
and Violante (2011), I follow Eva Nagypal (2008) and choose the value that is
consistent with empirical job-to-job transitions. Using data from the Survey of
Income and Program Participation (SIPP), Nagypal (2008) finds monthly job-to-
job flows of around 2.2%.3 These job-to-job flows imply a unique value for f e.
3Empirical job-to-job transitions can be found in Bruce C. Fallick and Charles A. Fleischman
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Consider the job-to-job flows implied by the model, they are given by
χ = f e
∫ pmax
p∗
(1− F (p))dG(p). (3.14)
Intuitively, workers move jobs if they receive and offer, which happens at rate f e,
and if the offer implies a higher wage, which happens with probability 1 − F (p).
The above expression averages these “job transition” rates over the distribution
of matches G(p). The appendix shows that the transition rate χ is given by
χ =
s(f e + s)log( s+f
e
s
)
f e
− s. (3.15)
Solving this equation numerically implies a value for fw of around 0.07.4 The
other parameters are chosen in the same way as in section 2.4.
With on-the-job search only, the magnitude of the Mm ratio is similar to
the one of the model with loss of human capital during unemployment, around
1.16.5 As discussed in Chapter 2, with unemployment history the model delivers
an Mm ratio of 1.21. When both unemployment history and on-the-job search
are included, the model generates an Mm ratio of around 2.07, and accounts for
all of the observed residual wage dispersion.
(2004), G. Moscarini and F. Vella (2008) and Nagypal (2008). I use the lowest value, which
corresponds to Nagypal (2008) to show that even with the lowest estimates the model generates
large amounts of wage dispersion.
4The expression for χ is the same as in Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2011), thanks to the
result that the reservation productivities are constant and independent of workers’ unemploy-
ment history γ.
5If the highest value for the arrival of offers on-the-job is used instead, the Mm ratio goes up
to 1.27.
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3.3 Trade-off between Frictional Wage Disper-
sion and Cyclical Unemployment Fluctua-
tions
As discussed in Chapter 1, Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2011) show that in
search models frictional wage dispersion and unemployment volatility are closely
related. The baseline search model usually requires high values of the replacement
ratio to match the cyclical volatility of unemployment and vacancies. However,
high values of the replacement ratio make the frictional wage dispersion problem
worse. Intuitively, if benefits are higher relative to average wages the value of work-
ers’ outside option increases, so workers accept only better paying jobs. Workers
wait longer to accept a job offer and wage dispersion decreases. On the other
hand, higher benefits are needed to generate fluctuations in unemployment and
vacancies that are in line with empirical observations. Intuitively, high replace-
ment ratios —or value of non-market time— shrink firms’ profits, which implies
that small changes in profits imply large percentage changes in profits. As profits
is one of the main drivers of job creation, higher replacement ratios amplify the
movements in vacancies and unemployment. Therefore, in search models there is
a trade-off between matching the unemployment volatility during the cycle and
generating sizable wage dispersion.
I calculate the Mm ratio in the model with both on-the-job search and un-
employment history for the different values of the replacement ratio ρ used in the
literature. As discussed in Chapter 1, Shimer (2005) uses a value of 0.40, which
is the value Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2011) and the previous sections use
to assess frictional wage dispersion. Hall and Milgrom (2008) choose ρ to be 0.71
based on data on the elasticity of labor supply. Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008)
choose the value of the replacement ratio that matches the elasticity of labor
market tightness, which gives the highest value in the literature of around 0.95.6
6Chapter 1 discusses the criticisms Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) received for using this
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Table 3.1: Mm ratio with on-the-job search
Calibration source ρ Mm ratio
Shimer (2005) 0.40 2.07
Hall & Milgrom (2008) 0.71 1.84
Hagedorn & Manovskii (2008) 0.95 1.68
Table 3.1 gives the Mm ratio for the three values of the replacement ratio.
The Mm ratio is 2.07 with a replacement ratio of 0.40, goes down to 1.84 if the
replacement ratio is 0.71, and bottoms at 1.68 for the highest replacement ratio of
0.95. Therefore, even for the highest value of the replacement ratio the amount of
wage dispersion is very large. Although some wage dispersion remains unexplained
for higher values of the replacement ratio, the model with both on-the-job search
and unemployment history accounts for almost all of the observed residual wage
dispersion. Figure 3.1 shows the Mm ratio as a function of the replacement ratio
ρ for the three models: the baseline search model, the model with unemployment
history, and the model with unemployment history and on-the-job search.
high value. In a nutshell, Costain and Reiter (2008) and Hall and Milgrom (2008) point out that
with this very high value labor supply becomes very responsive to unemployment benefits. See
Chapter 1 for the reply in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008).
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Figure 3.1: Mm ratio and replacement rates
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3.4 Mathematical Derivations
3.4.1 Mm Ratio with On-the-Job Search
The asset equations are given by
rU = b+ fu
∫ wmax
w∗
(W (y)− U)dF (y), (3.16)
rW (w) = w + f e
∫ wmax
w
(W (y)−W (w))dF (y)− s(W (w)− U). (3.17)
As shown in the text, the endogenous distribution of wages G(w) is
G(w) =
s
s+ f e(1− F (w))F (w). (3.18)
The average observed wage is now given by
w¯ =
∫ wmax
w∗
wdG(w). (3.19)
Given that U is workers’ outside option, W (w∗) = U . Combining both asset
equations with w = w∗ gives
w∗ = b+ (fu − f e)
∫ wmax
w∗
(W (y)− U)dF (y) (3.20)
Now, solving the integral by parts gives that
∫ wmax
w∗
(W (y)− U)dF (y) = [(W (y)− U)F (y)]wmaxw∗ −
∫ wmax
w∗
W ′(y)F (y)dy
(3.21)
= W (wmax)− U −
∫ wmax
w∗
W ′(y)F (y)dy (3.22)
=
∫ wmax
w∗
W ′(y)(1− F (y))dy. (3.23)
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Differentiating the asset equation (3.17) with respect to w and substituting in the
above equation gives that
∫ wmax
w∗
(W (y)− U)dF (y) =
∫ wmax
w∗
1− F (y)
r + s+ f e(1− F (y))dy. (3.24)
Using the expression for G(w) gives that
1−G(w) = s+ f
e
s+ f e(1− F (w))(1− F (w)) (3.25)
' r + s+ f
e
r + s+ f e(1− F (w))(1− F (w)), (3.26)
where the last approximation holds if r is small relative to s and f e. Finally,
plugging these results into (3.20) one gets that
w∗ = b+ (fu − f e)
∫ wmax
w∗
1−G(y)
r + s+ f e
dy. (3.27)
To get the Mm ratio first note that using integration by parts again gives
w¯ =
∫ wmax
w∗
ydG(y) (3.28)
= wmax −
∫ wmax
w∗
G(y)dy (3.29)
= w∗ +
∫ wmax
w∗
(1−G(y))dy, (3.30)
where the last equation is derived by adding and subtracting w∗. Finally, the Mm
ratio can be solved for by combining all these results to get
w∗ = b+
fu − f e
r + s+ f e
(w¯ − w∗), (3.31)
which after noting that b = ρw¯ gives the expression for the Mm ratio in the text.
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3.4.2 Mm Ratio with On-the-Job Search and Unemploy-
ment History
Using the asset equations wages are given by w(γ, p) = h(γ)wˆ(p), and similarly
W (γ, p) = h(γ)Wˆ (p). The paper investigates wage dispersion among identical
workers, so I focus on the dispersion of wˆ(p), the wage adjusted for human capital.
The Mm ratio is given by
Mm = ¯ˆw/p∗. (3.32)
where
¯ˆw =
∫ pmax
p∗
wˆ(y)dG(y). (3.33)
Using integration by parts one gets
¯ˆw = [wˆ(y)G(y)]p
max
p∗ −
∫ pmax
p∗
wˆ′(y)G(y)dy. (3.34)
Given that G(p) is the endogenous distribution of observed productivities, G(pmax)
is 1 and G(p∗)0 is 0. Using that wˆ(p∗) = p∗ gives
¯ˆw = p∗ +
∫ pmax
p∗
wˆ′(y)(1−G(y))dy (3.35)
Using the asset equations gives
(r + µ+ s)Wˆ ′(p) = wˆ′(p) + fw
(
0 +
∫ pmax
p∗
−Wˆ ′(p)dF (y)
)
, (3.36)
which implies the following expression
(r + µ+ fw(1− F (p)))Wˆ ′(p) = wˆ′(p). (3.37)
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Use asset equations U(γ) and W (γ, p∗) to get expression (3.12), which after di-
viding by h(γ) and rearranging becomes
p∗ =
r + µ
r + µ+ δ
b+
(
fu
r + µ
r + µ+ δ
− fw
)∫ pmax
p∗
Wˆ ′(y)(1− F (y))dy, (3.38)
where the above equation uses that
∫ pmax
p∗
(Wˆ (y)− Wˆ (p∗))dF (y) =
∫ pmax
p∗
Wˆ ′(y)(1− F (y))dy. (3.39)
To find the average wage ¯ˆw I now derive the endogenous distribution G(p). Given
the paper’s focus on the steady state, without loss of generality I assume that
F (p∗) = 0. The results are exactly the same without this assumption, but the
derivation is simpler.7 The interpretation is that fu becomes the job finding rate.
Consider the group of employed workers in a job with productivity lower than p.
In steady state the following flow equation holds
(1− u)G(p)(s+ fw(1− F (p))) = fuF (p)u. (3.40)
The left-hand side of the above equation are the flows out of the group, and
consists of job separations and quits to better jobs with productivity still lower
than p. The right-hand side are the flows in, which consist of unemployed workers
who find a job with productivity lower than p. Similarly, in steady state
ufu(1− F (p∗)) = (1− u)s. (3.41)
These equations imply that
G(p) = F (p)
(
s
s+ fw(1− F (p)
)
, (3.42)
7Reservation productivity p∗ is constant in steady state. Unless one is interested in business
cycle properties, or in how shocks affect the economy, this assumption is irrelevant.
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Thus
1−G(p) =
(
s+ fw
s+ fw(1− F (p))
)
(1− F (p)) (3.43)
'
(
r + µ+ s+ fw
r + µ+ s+ fw(1− F (p))
)
(1− F (p)), (3.44)
where the last approximation is true if r is small relative to s or fw. Substituting
the above expression for 1− F (p∗) in the equation for p∗ gives
p∗ =
r + µ
r + µ+ δ
b+
(
fu( r+µ
r+µ+δ
)− fw
r + µ+ s+ fw
)
( ¯ˆw − p∗), (3.45)
which gives, noting that b = ρ ¯ˆw, the expression for the Mm ratio in the text.
Mm ' 1 +
( r+µ
r+µ+δ
)fu−fw
r+µ+s+fw
( r+µ
r+µ+δ
)ρ+
( r+µ
r+µ+δ
)fu−fw
r+µ+s+fw
. (3.46)
3.4.3 Job-to-job flows and arrival rate of job offers on-the-
job f e
Similar to Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2011), I follow Nagypal (2008) to find
f e from the job-to-job flows χ. Begin with the following equation
χ = f e
∫ pmax
p∗
(1− F (p))dG(p). (3.47)
Integrating by parts gives the following
χ = f e − f e
(
[F (p)G(p)]p
max
p∗ −
∫ pmax
p∗
G(p)dF (p)
)
(3.48)
= f e
∫ pmax
p∗
G(p)dF (p). (3.49)
104
Using (3.42) finally gives
χ = f e
∫ pmax
p∗
sF (p)
s+ f e(1− F (p))dF (p). (3.50)
Now, the integrand is simply a function of F (p) that is integrated over dF (p).
Using the change of variable F (p) = z, and noting that at the boundaries of
integration p∗ and pmax variable z is 0 and 1, gives that
χ = f e
∫ 1
0
z
s+ f e(1− z)dz, (3.51)
which has a closed form solution, as given in the text
χ =
s(f e + s)log( s+f
e
s
)
f e
− s. (3.52)
Given χ from the data, I back out f e by solving the above equation numerically,
which gives the value in the text.
105
Concluding Remarks
Motivated by the findings of Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2011) that baseline
search models fail to generate significant wage dispersion, this thesis investigates
how much wage dispersion arises if workers lose some skills during unemployment.
I begin by illustrating the frictional wage dispersion puzzle and how it relates to the
Shimer critique, the inability of search models to generate significant fluctuations
in unemployment and vacancies. A summary of the empirical literature on the
effects of job displacement on workers’s labor outcomes provides evidence that
unemployment causes large and persistent earnings losses.
I develop a search model in which workers gradually lose some human capital
while they stay unemployed. The wage losses caused by unemployment matter
for workers’ search behavior. Knowing that unemployment hurts their earnings,
workers lower their reservation productivity and accept lower wages to leave un-
employment more quickly. The paper shows that the model generates significant
wage dispersion among identical workers and is an important improvement over
baseline search models. Using the measure proposed by Hornstein, Krusell and
Violante (2011), the Mm ratio, I find a closed form expression for wage dispersion
that depends only on a few parameters. Combining the theoretical predictions of
the model and estimates from micro data, the model explains between 45% and
48% of the observed residual wage dispersion in the PSID, and between 24% and
31% of that in the CPS. By contrast, the baseline model accounts for around 11%
for the PSID, and 6% for the CPS.
When workers also search on-the-job, the model with unemployment history
106
accounts for all of the observed residual wage dispersion. In search models there
is a trade-off between accounting for frictional wage dispersion and cyclical fluc-
tuations in unemployment and vacancies. High values of non-market time make
it more difficult for search models to generate significant amounts of wage disper-
sion, but high values of non-market time are required to account for the cyclical
volatility of unemployment and vacancies. I show that even for high values of
non-market time the search framework with both unemployment history and on-
the-job search generates large amounts of wage dispersion, and accounts for almost
all of residual wage dispersion. The paper thus addresses the trade-off in search
models between matching frictional wage dispersion and the cyclical behavior of
unemployment and vacancies.
In recessions jobs become scarce, unemployment rises, and workers take longer
to find jobs. The results of this paper suggest that, by accounting for workers’
human capital depreciation during unemployment, the welfare losses in recessions
may be larger than previously thought. In the context of the recent crisis, the
consequences for workers’ labor market prospects have been dramatic, suggesting
that one should take these costs into account.
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